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City of St. Louis v. Golden Gate Corp.1
The city of St. Louis, pursuant to a municipal minimum housing standards
ordinance,2 filed a petition in circuit court alleging that the defendant, the owner
of certain property, had, with notice of numerous violations, willfully permitted
the violations to continue. These violations resulted in the property being "immi-
nently dangerous and unsafe" and endangering the safety, health, and welfare
of persons on and near the premises. The city alleged that it had no adequate
remedy at law and sought in the alternative, a prohibitory injunction, or a manda-
tory injunction, or the appointment of a receiver with the authority to borrow
money for repairs and to place a lien on the property for the cost of the repairs.
Defendant's motions to dismiss, alleging the invalidity and unconstitutionality of
the ordinance,3 were sustained by the trial court, and plaintiff's petition was dis-
missed with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed. The Missouri Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment dismissing plaintiff's petition. The supreme court held
that "the relief of appointment of a receiver to collect rents, borrow money, use
such funds for repairs and give priority for such obligations over rights of owners
and mortgagees is beyond the general power of a court of equity,"4 and that such
relief must have statutory authorization offering proper constitutional safeguards,
Generally, the appointment of receivers is used in cases concerning property
which is involved in litigation, and where it is necessary for the preservation and
1. 421 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1967).
2. ST. Louis, Mo., REvisED CoDE § 393.110 (1960), provides that the Build-
ing Commissioner, after making a determination that the safety, health, or welfare
of persons on or near the property is endangered, may file a petition in the circuit
court alleging continued violations of the Housing Code and praying for: a pro-
hibitory injunction against further Code violations; or a mandatory injunction
ordering compliance with Code provisions, or ordering the premises to be razed if
there is a failure to timely comply; or the appointment of a receiver to collect all
rents and profits, make the necessary repairs, and encumber the property as secur-
ity for the cost of such repairs.
3. Defendant contended that the ordinance was: a denial of due process,
in that it authorized the taking of property without just compensation; an un-
reasonable exercise of the police power; an invalid use of the city's constitutional
charter powers in that it authorized appointment of a receiver as the sole remedy
for enforcement of an ordinance; an unconstitutional delegation of legislative au-
thority to-the judiciary; and an impairment of defendant's obligation of contract
with the holder of note and deed of trust by depriving defendant of rents.
4. City of St. Louis v. Golden Gate Corp., 421 S.W.2d 4, 7- (Mo. 1967);
(115)
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maintenance of that property.5 The power of a court of equity to appoint a re-
ceiver in such a case is considered to be inherent in the court's general equity
jurisdiction.6 This power is also legislatively recognized in Missouri's general re-
ceivership statute,7 which has been consistently construed to vest in the cir-
cuit judge a broad discretion concerning the appointment of a receiver. 8 How-
ever, where the receivership sought does not fall within categories tradition-
ally recognized as appropriate,9 the Missouri Supreme Court has not permitted
such broad discretion, and has refused to appoint a receiver. 10 This approach
was followed in the noted case, where the statute was construed as neither
enlarging nor restricting Pomeroy's four general classes of cases." The holding that
appointment of a receiver is inappropriate in the aid of enforcement of a municipal
housing standards ordinance confirms the fears of some commentators that without
statutory authority of some kind, the general equity powers of a court would be
insufficient to support the appointment of a receiver in a slum housing case.
12
Plaintiff alternatively sought injunctive relief pursuant to another section of
the municipal ordinance discussed above.13 However, because the supreme court
felt that plaintiff failed to brief this issue on appeal, the court dealt only briefly
with the availability of such injunctive relief. The supreme court seemed to feel,
as it did in the case of the section of the ordinance dealing with receivership, that
the injunctive relief section simply granted authority to the plaintiff to request
such relief, but did not confer authority on the circuit court to grant it. In the
5. Stipp v. Bailey, 62 S.W.2d 482 (Spr. Mo. App. 1933); H. McCLiNTocx,
Eguinr § 211 (2d ed. 1948).
6. Bushman v. Bushman, 311 Mo. 551, 560, 279 S.W. 122, 125 (1925);
1 R. CLARK, RECEIVERS § 46(a) (3rd ed. 1959).
7. Section 515.240, RSMo 1959 provides: "The court, or any judge thereof
in vacation, shall have power to appoint a receiver whenever such appointment
shall be deemed necessary, whose duty it shall be to keep and preserve any money
or other thing deposited in court, or that may be subject of a tender, and to keep
and preserve all property and protect any business or business interest entrusted
to him pending any legal or equitable proceeding concerning the same, subject to
the order of the court."
8. Abramsky v. Abramsky, 261 .Mo. 117, 125-26, 168 S.W. 1178, 1179-80
(1914); Goll v. Kahler, 422 S.W.2d 359, 362-63 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
9. 4 J. POMEROY, EguITy JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1332-35 (5th ed. 1941) states
that a receiver may be appointed where: there is no competent person to hold and
manage the property during a judicial proceeding, all the parties are equally en-
titled to possession of the property involved in litigation, a trustee is violating his
fiduciary duties, or after judgment for the purpose of carrying the decree into effect
10. See Kansas City v. Markham, 339 Mo. 753, 99 S.W.2d 28 (1936) (in
suit to enjoin loan company from lending at illegal interest, receiver sought on
grounds that the business was a nuisance); Sedberry v. Gwynn, 282 Mo. 632, 221
S.W. 783 (1920) (receiver sought for a solvent manufacturing business due "to
breach of a supply contract and threats by defendant); Price v. Bankers' Trust Co-
of St. Louis, 178 S.W. 745 (Mo. 1915) (receiver sought as the sole remedy by
creditors of a solvent country club).
11. City of St. Louis v. Golden Gate Corp., 421 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Mo. 1967).
12. Comment, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 141, 151 (1967); comment, 18 W. REs. L.
REv. 1705, 1721 (1967).
13. ST. Louis, Mo., REVISED CODE § 393.110 (1960).
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absence of such authority, the supreme court apparently concluded that other
traditional limitations on equity jurisdiction prohibited the granting of injunctive
relief.
One of the limitations on such jurisdiction is the doctrine which prohibits
equity from enjoining commission of a crime. 14 It is questionable whether viola-
tion of a housing standards ordinance should be conceptualized as a crime. The
Missouri Supreme Court has construed prosecutions by municipalities for violation
of housing code ordinances to be civil actions to recover a debt or penalty due
the city because of the violation. 15 Moreover, the Missouri cases allow equity to
act where the acts sought to be enjoined are prejudicial to the public health and
welfare, i.e. public nuisances,16 even though the party creating the public nuisance
may also be liable for prosecution under state or municipal laws.17 This is in accord
with traditional views of equity powers.' 8 However, the supreme court concluded
that a public nuisance theory was inapplicable in the noted case because the city
did not proceed on such a theory, and also because many of the violations were
minor in character.19
The supreme court felt that equitable relief of any kind was unavailable
bceause the plaintiff had failed to show that the remedies at law were inadequate.
the briefs of plaintiff and amicus curiae argued the inadequacy of available legal
remedies-quasi-criminal prosecution, condemnation, and special tax liens for re-
pairs done by the city.20 The effectiveness of the use of criminal proceedings and
penalties in housing code violation cases has decreased in recent years, primarily
because it is cheaper for slum landlords to pay the fine rather than repair the
property.21 Condemnation is an unsatisfactory remedy since this would only aggra-
vate the housing shortage.22 The use of special tax liens requires the city to have
the funds initially, in order to make repairs, and limited resources mean fewer
repairs. 23 The supreme court, however, simply dismissed the preceding arguments
with little discussion.
Six states have legislation authorizing receivership and either a prior lien on
14. State ex rel. Allai v. Thatch, 361 Mo. 190, 198, 234 S.W.2d 1, 7 (En Banc
1950).
15. City of St. Louis v. Flynn, 386 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Mo. 1965).
16. State ex rel. Allai v. Thatch, 361 Mo. 190, 198, 234 S.W.2d 1, 7 (En Banc
1950).
17. City of Washington v. Mueller, 218 S.W.2d 801, 803 (St. L. Mo. App.
1949).
18. 4 J. PoMmRoY, EqurTy JURISPRUDENCE § 1349 (5th ed. 1941).
19. City of St. Louis v. Golden Gate Corp., 421 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Mo. 1967).
20. Brief for Appellant, pp. 21-28, Brief for the NAACP as amicus curiae,
pp. 6-7, City of St. Louis v. Golden Gate Corp., 421 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1967).
21. Moerdler, A Program for Housing Maintenance and Emergency Repair,
42 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 165, 172 (1967); Comment, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 1705, 1721
& n. 133 (1967); Note, 63 MicH. L. REv. 1304, 1308 (1965).
22. Brief for Appellant, p. 26, Brief for the NAACP as amicus curiae, p. 10,
City of St. Louis v. Golden Gate Corp., 421 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1967).
23. Brief for the NAACP as amicus curiae, p. 7, City of St. Louis v. Golden
Gate Corp., 421 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1967).
1969]
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the entire property or a lien on rents until the cost of repairs is repaid.24 The only
judicial test of such a state receivership statute has been in New York. In In re
Dep't of Bldgs. of City of New York,25 the New York Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the 1962 Receivership Law,28 even though it impaired the
mortgagee's rights under his prior mortgage contract by postponing his right to
the rents until the lien for the cost of repairs was repaid. The statute authorized
the Department of Buildings, upon the certification of a "nuisance, ' 2' to issue
an order to the owner to remove the nuisance within a specified time 28 If this
was not done, the department was authorized to apply to the supreme court for
appointment of a receiver to remove or remedy the condition, with a lien for the
costs incurred.20 The statute allowed the owner or mortgagee to apply to the court
for permission to perform the work in lieu of appointing a receiver.30 The stat-
utory lien was to be subject to the rights of holders of previously recorded mort-
gages or liens, except that any mortgagee or lienor duly served with the notice
required by statute was not entitled to the rents or profits and could not fore-
close his mortgage or lien until the receiver's lien was fully paid and satisfied.31
One of the mortgagee's contentions was that the statute was an unconstitutional
impairment of his rights under his prior mortgage contract.3 2 The court held that
this legislation was a reasonable exercise of the state's police power to promote
the public interest in maintaining an adequate supply of safe and sanitary hous-
ing.33 Citing the landmark case of Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blasdell,34 the
New York court recognized that the state is not prevented from exercising such
powers merely because contracts between individuals may be affected. The court
distinguished their 1938 decision in Central Say. Bank v. City of New York,35
which held a 1937 amendment authorizing a lien having "priority over all other
liens and encumbrances, including [previously recorded] mortgages"3 6 as an un-
constitutional taking of property without due process of law, and as an uncon-
stitutional impairment of the mortgagee's contract with the mortgagorSr In Cen-
24. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-347b (Supp. 1966) (prior lien on the fee);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) (prior lien on the fee);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6144 (1967) (prior lien on the fee); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 111, § 127H (Supp. 1967) (lien on rents); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-79 (Supp.
1967) (lien on rents); N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. § 309(a) (Supp. 1967) (prior lien on
the fee).
25. 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964).
26. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. § 309, as amended, N.Y. SEss. LAws 1962, ch. 492,§31.
27. Id., § 309(1)(a).
28. Id., § 309(1)(e).
29. Id., § 309(5)(c) (1).
30. Id., § 309(5)(c)(3).
31. Id., § 309(5)(e).
32. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
33. In re Dep't of Bldgs. of City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 291, 297, 200
N.E.2d 432, 436, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441, 446 (1964).
34., 290 U.S. 398, 437 (1934).
35. 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 151 (1938).
36. N.Y. Sass. LAws 1937, ch. 353 (g).
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ral Savings the court held the statute procedurally defective, in that the mortgagee
was given no notice or opportunity to be heard, whereas under the 1962 amend-
ment involved in In re Dept. of Bldgs., the mortgagee must be given notice and
an opportunity to participate in the proceedings. As to the impairment of contract
rights argument, the court said the Central Savings decision can not be relied on
to invalidate the 1962 amendment:
We assess the propriety and reasonableness and, by that token, the
validity of an exercise of the police power in light of the conditions
confronting the Legislature when it acts, and it can hardly be questioned
that the situation, in terms of the shortage of safe and adequate dwelling
units, which prompted the 1962 amendment (L. 1962, ch. 492, §1) pre-
sented a far more serious emergency than that existing in 1937.as
The "balancing" approach used by the New York court in In re Dep't of Bldgs. to
determine the validity of exercises of the police power lends support to the belief
that under the ever increasing dilemma of slum housing, priority liens on the
entire property may pass constitutional muster.39
Yet the New York statute upheld in In re Dep't of Bldgs. provided only for
a lien on rents until the cost of repairs was repaid, whereas the ordinance involved
in the noted case granted authority to the city to seek a prior lien on the fee.
The supreme court in Golden Gate apparently viewed the "permissive" St. Louis
ordinance as being similar to the 1937 New York statute invalidated in Central
Savings. It distinguished the 1962 New York statute involved in In re Dep't of
Bldgs. and the St. Louis ordinance by saying that the 1962 New York statute
"afforded some protection of the rights of mortgagees by only postponing the
right to collect rents until the cost of removing dangerous conditions have been
repaid, instead of making such cost a prior lien to the mortgage." 40 A 1965
amendment to the New York statute,41 now providing for a prior lien on the fee;
has not yet been judicially tested. Such a statute would seem to be constitutionally
questionable in Missouri, in light of the above quoted dictum from the noted
case, which emphasizes the idea of "limited priority."
Recent commentaries speculate that a prior lien on the fee will withstand
constitutional due process and impairment of obligation of contract objections, 42
characterizing Central Savings as reflecting the "last gasp of the now discredited
doctrine of substantive due process, long used to protect property interests against
police power regulations." 43 A Columbia University legislative drafting research
38. In re Dep't of Bldgs. of City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 291, 300, 200
N.E.2d 432, 438, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441, 449 (1964).
39. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1254, 1272-73 (1966); Comment, 1967 WAsH. U.L.Q. 141, 156
(1967).
40. City of St. Louis v. Golden Gate Corp., 421 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Mo. 1967).
41. N.Y. MuLT. DwELL. § 309, as amended, N.Y. SEss. LAws 1965, ch. 144,§ 1.
42. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66
CoLtrM. L. REv. 1254, 1273 (1966); Moerdler, A Program for Housing Maintenance
an&Emergency Repair, 42 ST. JOHN's L' Rnv. 165, 19 (1967).
43. Gribetz & Grad, op. cit. supra note 42, at 1265.
-1969]
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paper points out that commentary of the 1930's, immediately following the Central
Savings decision, viewed it as an "anachronistic construction" of the state's
power in the field of substandard housing, and concludes that there is good reason
to rely on the validity of the 1965 prior lien provisions.44 On a practical level, the
argument has been made that the mortgagee who shares in the economic benefits
of slum housing should also share in the social costs 4 5
An incongruity in the court's reasoning in Central Savings in relation to the
impairment of contract contention has been noted by one commentator.4 o The
court admitted that the city, in the exercise of its police power, could close up,
restrict the use of, or demolish a building.47 Demolition would completely destroy
the mortgagee's security. Yet the court was unwilling to permit the use of a prior
lien, which would much less harshly affect the mortgagee's security. Moreover,
without the use of prior liens, the value of the lien to the cities would be insig-
nificant, since the heavily mortgaged slum property would be improved at the
city's expense and then prior mortgages would be foreclosed, leaving the property
improved, and leaving the city with a lien of no value 48
Dictum in the noted case indicates that the proposed expansion of the circuit
court's equity jurisdiction is a matter of "state interest,"49 and thus not authorized
by the constitutional grant of charter powers for local government. There is sim-
ilar dictum in previous Missouri cases."o The rationale for such dictum in the
noted case is that the circuit court is a state court and that any proposed ex-
pansion of its power or jurisdiction must be considered a matter of "state inter-
est." However, earlier Missouri decisions held that validly enacted ordinances of
a home rule city have the force and effect of laws within the meaning of the con-
stitutional provision conferring such jurisdiction on the circuit courts "as is or may
be provided by law."'
Without the enactment of a statute with "proper constitutional safeguards,"
authorizing appointment of receivers of rents,52 the Golden Gate decision leaves
44. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FuND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, LEGAL
REMEDIES IN HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT IN NEw YORK Crry 126 (1965).
45. Angevine & Taube, Enforcement of Public Health Laws--Some New Tech-
niques, 52 MASs. L.Q. 205, 228 (1967).
46. Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 275, 282 (1966).
47. Central Say. Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 279, 18 N.E.2d
151, 156 (1938).
48. Comment, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 141, 143 (1967); Note, 63 MICH. L. REV.
1304, 1308 (1965).
49. City of St. Louis v. Golden Gate Corp., 421 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Mo. 1967).
50. See Westbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri
Experience, 33 Mo. L. REv. 45, 56 & n. 59 (1968).
51. Union Depot R.R. v. Southern Ry., 105 Mo. 562, 16 S.W. 920 (En Banc
1891); Grand Avenue Ry. v. Lindell Ry., 148 Mo. 637, 50 S.W. 302 (En Banc
1899); Grand Avenue Ry. v. Citizens' Ry., 148 Mo. 665, 50 S.W. 305 (En Banc
1899).'
52. In the regular session of the 74th General Assembly, a proposed receiver-
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Missouri with the traditional legal remedies of criminal prosecutions, condemna-
tion, and special tax liens for repairs done by the city. The Missouri Supreme
Court's dictum in Golden Gate seems to indicate that "proper constitutional safe-
guards" means a lien on rents alone and not a prior lien on the entire property is
permissible. Such an approach would restrict the effectiveness of equity as a receiver
of rents to aid in the rehabilitation of slum housing in Missouri.
CLIFFORD H. AHRENS
ATTORNEYS' LIENS-LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT'S MOTOR
VEHICLE INSURER FOR LIEN OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY
Downs v. Hodge1
Hodge had a cause of action against Fender as the result of personal injuries
incurred in an automobile accident. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company was
Fender's liability insurer. Hodge contracted with the legal firm of Downs & Pierce
of St. Joseph, Missouri, plaintiff in the noted case, to represent him in his claim
against Fender. Downs & Pierce were to receive a contingent attorney's fee of
thirty three and one third per cent of any recovery obtained. State Farm had
notice of this contract. Downs & Pierce proceeded to litigate the case, incurred
expenses in relation thereto, and represented Hodge in the trial of the lawsuit at
Chillicothe, Missouri. The verdict was adverse to Hodge. Pending appeal, another
attorney, acting on behalf of Hodge and having had access to materials prepared
by Downs & Pierce, settled with State Farm for three thousand dollars. Plaintiff
never received legal fees in compensation for the services rendered Hodge.
Downs & Pierce commenced an action against their former client, Hodge, and
also against the insurer of Fender, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. After
dismissing the suit against Hodge, the plaintiff obtained a verdict against the in-
surer, whose appeal is the subject of this note. The Kansas City Court of Appeals
held that where a liability insurer is bound to defend the insured by reason of its
contract, it takes on the liabilities of the insured. And, by reason thereof, when it
settles with an adverse party in disregard of an outstanding attorneys' lien, the
insurer becomes liable for said lien.2
1. 413 S.W.2d 519 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
2. The Missouri statutory provisions on attorney's liens are §§ 484.130, .140,
RSMo 1959. Section 484.130, RSMo 1959 states:
From the commencement of an action or the service of an answer con-
taining a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien
upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a
verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor, and the proceeds
thereof in whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be affected by
any settlement between the parties before or after judgment.
Section 484.140, RSMo 1959 notes the legality of contingent fee contracts, and
provides that, upon proper notice, the attorney:
has a lien upon the claim or cause of action, and upon the proceeds of
any settlement thereof for such. attorney's portion or percentage thereof,
19691
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At common law, attorneys had no lien for their services in Missouri. The first
such lien was created by statute in 1901.3 The present version of the Missouri
Attorneys' Lien statute, sections 484.130 and 484.140, RSMo 1959, is identical to
that enacted in 1901. The courts of Missouri have found that these sections, and
their predecessors, are not unconstitutional 4 and have admonished that they are
to be liberally construed. 5 Once the lien has attached in favor of a plaintiff's attor-
ney (or in favor of the attorney of a defendant who has filed a counterclaim),
both parties to the lawsuit become liable on the lien in the event a judgment is
paid, or a settlement made and satisfied in disregard of that lien.8 The filing of a
suit or the service of an answer containing a counter-claim dispenses with the
necessity of giving the adverse party notice of the contingent fee contract which
creates the lien.7 As in the noted case, a settlement made without regard to the lien
of an attorney of record gives rise to a cause of action against the defendant for
the contracted percentage of the amount paid in satisfaction.8 The attorney's rem-
which the client may have against the defendant or defendants, or pro-
posed defendant or defendants, and cannot be affected by any settle-
ment between the parties either before suit or action is brought, or before
or after judgment therein, and any defendant or defendants, or proposed
defendant or defendants, who shall, after notice served as herein provided,
in any manner, settle any claim, suit, cause of action, or action at law
with such attorney's client, before or after litigation instituted thereon,
without first procuring the written consent of such attorney, shall be liable
to such attorney for such attorney's lien as aforesaid upon the proceeds
of such settlement, as per the contract existing as herein provided be-
tween such attorney and his client.
3. Laws, Mo. 1901, page 46, E.g. Imboden v. Renshaw, 102 Mo. App. 173,
76 S.W. 701 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903).
4. Taylor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 715, 97 S.W. 155 (1906); Noell
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 335 Mo. 687, 74 S.W.2d 7 (1934); see Annot., 94 A.L.R.
684 (1934).
5. Wait v. Archinson, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 204 Mo. 491, 103 S.W. 60 (En
Banc 1907); 'Lawson v. Missouri & Kansas Tel. Co., 178 Mo. App. 124, 164 S.W.
138 (K.C. Ct. App. 1914); Brookshire v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 S.W.2d
817 (St. L. Mo. App. 1933).
6. Lawson v. Missouri & Kansas Tel. Co., 178 Mo. App. 124, 164 S.W. 138
(K.C. Ct. App. 1914); Cell v. Robinson, 79 S.W.2d 489 (K.C. Mo. App. 1935);
Noell v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 335 Mo. 687, 74 S.W.2d 7 (1934); Gerritzen v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., 115 S.W.2d 44 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938). The United States
Supreme Court has found the Missouri statute constitutional as applied to de-
fendants in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Laughlin, 247 U.S. 204 (1918).
7. Satterfield v. Southern Ry. Co., 287 S.W.2d 395 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956);
Passer v. Berkenmaier, 183 S.W.2d 150 (St. L. Mo. App. 1944); Laughlin v. Ex-
celsior Powder Mfg. Co., 153 Mo. App. 508, 134 S.W. 116 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911);
Lawson v. Missouri & Kansas Tel. Co., 178 Mo. App. 124, 164 S.W. 138 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1914); Barthels v. Garrels, 206 Mo. App. 199, 227 S.W. 910 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1920).
8. Whitecotton v. St. Louis & H. Ry. Co., 250 Mo. 624, 157 S.W. 776 (1913);
Nelson v. Massman Const. Co., 120 S.W.2d 77 (K.C. Mo. App. 1938), certiorari
quasLed, State ex rel. Massman Const. Co. v. Shain, 344 Mo. 1003, 130 S.W.2d
491 (1939). Note that in Missouri an attorney cannot enforce his lien by con-
tinuing a suit which has been settled in disregrad of his lien. Mills v. Metropolitan
St. Ry. Co., 282 Mo. 118, 221 S.W. 1 (1921).
[Vol. 34
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edy where there has been a settlement in disregard of his lien is an. independent
action against his client or against the adverse party correspondin~g to the common
law action of trespass on the case.9 In such actions, contrary to the general rule,' o
Missouri follows a minority position in that the attorney is not required to prove,
that his client's cause of action was meritorious in order to enforce his lien against
the defendant who has settled with that client.11
Downs v. Hodge extends these principles to cover the factual-situation involv-
ing the defendant's liability insurer. In holding the insurer liable for the attorney's
lien, the Kansas City Court of Appeals relied on two general lines of reasoning.
(1) The court noted that the insurance company was bound to defend the suit
and to pay all sums which might arise out of Fender's operation of his automobile
by reason of the insurance contract. The company controlled the litigation, and its
lawyers defended the original suit. The language of the court is helpful: "For all
purposes connected with this case of Hodge v. Fender, defendant was the alter-ego
of Fender. Defendant was Fender. It, therefore, became and was liable to do, what
Fender was liable to do."' 2 According to Missouri precedent, if Fender settled with
Hodge in disregard of the lien of Hodge's attorney, he became liable, along with
Hodge, to satisfy that lien.'3 (2) Recognizing that the decision to be rendered
would enlarge the scope of enforcement of attorneys' liens in Missouri, the court
of appeals explained why such an extension was desirable in an historical sense.
Noting that this case arose sixty-seven years after the statute was first adopted, the
court reasoned that the law ought to grow along with the development of the
automobile industry and the corresponding growth of motor liability insurance.
The law, said the court, should take notice that motor vehicle liability insurance
is carried by almost every automobile operator 14 and is necessary for the automobile
owner's financial protection. The nature of such insurance, which puts the insurer
in the position of defendant for purposes of litigation and trial, should be con-
sidered by the courts in allocating the legal consequences of trial.
The issue presented in Downs v. Hodge has not often been considered by
American courts. In Berkemeier v. Dormuralt Motor Sales,15 an Illinois case,
Phillip Becker was injured as the result of the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle by Dormuralt Motor Sales. Dormuralt had an automobile liability insur-
ance policy with Eastern Automobile Insurance Underwriters. Berkemeier was re-
tained by Becker as his attorney. A settlement was entered into between the
insurer and Becker, who executed a release in favor of Dormuralt. The attorney
9. Noell v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 335 Mo. 687, 74 S.W.2d 7 (1934). This
problem does not arise where the attorney's lien has attached to a final judgment
because a payment by the judgment debtor to the judgment creditor in disregard
of an attorney's lien is void. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 464 (1958).
10. 7 AM. Jut. 2d Attorneys at Law § 305 (1963).
11. Noell v. Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co., 21 S.W.2d 937 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929),
cert.- denied 281 U.S. 766 (1929).
12. Downs v. Hodge, 413 S.W.2d 519 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967)..
13. Cases cited note 6 supra.
14. Se e §§ 303.010-.040, RSMo 1959.
15. 263 Ill. App. 211 (1931).
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brought action against both Dormuralt and the insurance company claiming the
former to be insolvent. In reversing a decree against both defendants, the Illinois
court held that the Attorneys' Lien Act of that state' 6 creates liability only against
the opposing party and not against his insurer. Since Becker's cause of action was
against Dormuralt and not Eastern Underwriters, the court, in adopting a literal
interpretation of the statute, denied recovery against the insurer.17
A later New York case, Koenig v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,'s
allowed a plaintiff's attorney to recover in an independent action against the de-
fendant's insurance carrier. In that case the attorney had given notice of his lien
to the defendant prior to a settlement made between the plaintiff and the defend-
ant's insurer. The insurance carrier was held liable to the attorney for his lien.
Although the New York statute'9 makes no provision as to the insurer, Aetna failed
to make an objection on that ground.
A third case, which established a lien in favor of an attorney against the
insurer of an adverse party, did not deal with automobile liability insurance, but
with workmen's compensation. Camp v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com-
pany,20 a Georgia case, arose out of the failure of the defendant or his insurer to
pay compensation awarded by the Industrial Commission of Georgia. At a later
stage in the litigation, the employee settled directly with the employer and his
insurer on the workmen's compensation claim. The employee's attorney proceeded
against both the employer and insurer. The insurer's demurrer was granted in the
lower court, but reversed in the Court of Appeals of Georgia. The court held that
the defendants were "not at liberty to satisfy the award until the lien or claim of
the attorney for his fee is fully satisfied." 21
Although Downs concerned motor vehicle liability insurance, the rule it
establishes might also be applied to the area of workmen's compensation by the
Missouri courts. Indeed, in Clark v. Midwest Bakeries & Macaroni Manufacturing
Company,22 where the facts were very similar to Camp, Missouri courts dealt with
the attempt of an employee's attorney to recover against an employed and his
insurer who failed to satisfy an attorney's lien after notice had been given them.
The issue was avoided, however, by pointing out that the appropriate section of
the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Actm purports to preserve awards of the
Industrial Commission against "the claims of all persons except as to attorneys'
fees and even then only to the extent the Commission may allow."24 In this case
the Commissioner did not allow the lien against the client (employee), and there-
16. Cahill's St. ch. 13, 113 (1927).
17. Berkemeier v. Dormuralt Motor Sales, 263 Ill. App. 211, 218-219 (1931).
18. 7 A.D.2d 903, 182 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1959).
19. N.Y. JUDIcIARY LAw § 474 (McKinney 1948).
20. 42 Ga. App. 653,. 157 S.E. 209 (1931).
21. Id. at 654, 157 S.E. at 210.
22. Clark v. Midwest Bakeries & Macaroni Mfg. Co., 240 Mo. App. 18, 201
S.W.2d 423 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
23. § 287.260, RSMo 1959.
24. Clark v. Midwest Bakeries & Macaroni Mfg. Co., 240 Mo. App. i8, 201
S.W.2d 423 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
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fore the lien could not be enforced against the employer or the insurer.2 5 If the
lien had been allowed against the client, the court would have had to determine
whether the insurer could be held liable. Had such a determination been necessary,
it is possible that the Downs rule could be applied to workmen's compensation
insurers. The language in section 287.260, RSMo 1959 allows attorneys' liens against
compensation awards at the discretion of the Commissioner. Section 287.300,
RSMo 1959, provides that, if an employer is insured, "his liability shall be second-
ary and indirect, and his insurer shall be primarily and directly liable hereunder
to the injured employee, his dependents or other persons entitled to righ-ts here-
-under" (emphasis added). In view of these statutory provisions, companies en-
gaged in insuring employers under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be
aware of possible liability to an employee's attorney if they satisfy awards in
disregard of the lien of that attorney 26
Since the Kansas City Court of Appeals has shown a willingness to enlarge
the scope of recovery available to an attorney for the enforcement of his lien in
the Downs case, it is useful to speculate as to what further extensions might be
made to the scope of the Missouri Attorney's Lien Act. Such speculation can lead
to another rapidly expanding area of the law-uninsured motorist coverage insur-
ance. An analogy can be drawn between the position of a defendant's liability
insurer and the corresponding position of an uninsured motorist insurer whose
liability exists when the defendant has no liability insurance.2 7 This insurer does not
stand in the shoes of the uninsured motorist for purposes of litigation against the
insured, but it does replace the defendant's liability with its own to the extent
of the policy limits. If the insurer settles a claim of its insured under uninsured
motorist coverage without regard to the fees due the insured's attorney, is the
insurer liable to the attorney under the Attorneys' Lien Act? A settlement be-
tween a plaintiff-insured and his uninsured motorist insurer does not release the
defendant from responsibility for his original tort. To the contrary, section 379.203,
Laws 1967, p. - , H.B. No. 262, § A gives the insurer the right of subrogation
against any "person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury for
which such payment is made ... " Therefore, at least in theory, the attorney
still has a lien on the cause of action against the defendant. But, for practical
purposes, even if the attorney retains a lien against the surviving cause of action,
such a remedy is usually of no value because the uninsured defendant is usually
judgment-proof.
There is an additional barrier to the enforcement of an attorney's lien in an
uninsured motorist case. The uninsured motorist policy normally will contain a
25. There can be no lien in favor of an attorney unless there is a contract debt
due him from his client. Mills v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 282 Mo. 118, 221 S.W.
1 (1920).
26. Other liability insurers should also be aware of Downs, since the rationale
of the decision likely extends to all types of liability insurers.
27. Missouri enacted a statute dealing with uninsured motorist coverage
in January, 1967. § 379.203, Laws 1967, p. -, H.B. No. 262, § A.
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clause giving the insurer the right of subrogation against the uninsured motorist.28
If the policy has fully compensated the insured for all injuries incurred, thus
barring him from a second recovery against the uninsured tortfeasor, the result
is the same as if the claim of the insured had been assigned to his insurer.29 Either
result would act to forestall recovery by the attorney of his reasonable attorney
fees. In the first instance, a possible lien on the cause of action against the unin-
sured tortfeasor will most likely be uncollectible because of the probable insolvency
of said tortfeasor. In the second instance, recovery by his client might extinguish
the attorney's lien altogether because the cause of action is now in the hands of
the insurer. In this situation, for either of these reasons, a court may well decide
to allow the attorney to enforce his lien against the uninsured motorist insurer.
Since the Missouri Attorney's Lien statute was enacted in 1901, a defendant
has been responsible for the attorney's lien attached to a cause of action against
him if he settles in disregard of that lien. The Downs decision puts the defendant's
liability insurer in the same position of not being able to settle in disregard of a
lien. To guard against liability, the insurer should obtain a written consent to the
settlement from the attorney or attorneys of the adverse party3 0 An alternative
safeguard would be for the insurer to make the claimant's attorney joint payee on
the settlement draft. The insurer must avoid the mistake in Downs where the set-
tlement was made through one attorney but in disregard of the rights of another
attorney who had been in the case at an earlier stage; in other words, the insurer
muse be careful that it has the consent of all attorneys who might have a lien on
the proceeeds of any settlement made with plaintiff.
The decision in Downs v. Hodge is an extension of the Missouri Attorneys'
Lien Act designed to assure that lawyers will be compensated for their services. As
such, attorneys, as well as liability insurance companies, should be aware of its
existence and significance.
MICHAEL L. BoIcouRT
28. To understand the full significance of such a clause, see Williams, Unin-
sured Motorist Insurance-Subrogaton---Settlement witk Tortfeasor, 32 Mo. L.
Rv. 159 (1967).
29. Williams, supra note 28, at 164. A problem arises here as the result of the
general rule prohibiting assignment of a personal tort action. See Annot., 40
A.L.R.2d 500 (1955).
30. According to one early case, the burden of proof is on the attorney to
prove he did not consent in writing to the settlement. Wolf v. United Rys. Co. of
St. Louis, 155 Mo. App. 125, 133 S.W. 1172 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911). Note also the
language in § 484.140, RSMo 1959.
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss1/13
RECENT CASES . ,
NEW TRIAL-VERDICT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Lupkey v. Weldon (concurring opinion)1
In a libel action, after the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The defendant had denied the
allegations of the petition, but had adduced no substantial evidence in his behalf
at trial. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court, in an opinion limited to libel
actions, affirmed the lower court order.2 The majority opinion states the usual
rule that an order for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence will be overturned on appeal only where a verdict contrary
to the one brought in by the jury could never be permitted to stand; or, where
the trial court should have directed a verdict against the party at whose instance
the new trial was granted 3 However, the majority opinion then goes on to find
this rule to be inapplicable in libel cases. Article I, Section 8 of the Missouri Con-
stitution provides that in libel suits the jury shall determine the law and the facts;
and this section has been" interpreted to mean that a verdict may never be directed
for a plaintiff in a libel suit.4 Therefore, an order granting the defendant in a libel
suit a new trial because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence will never
be overturned. 5
The concurring opinion, on the other hand, indicated that the decision should
not be limited to libel cases. The concurring opinion maintained that the lower
court should be affirmed, regardless of the fact that it was a libel case, because
when a defendant is granted a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence, there need not be any substantial evidence in the
record to have supported a verdict for the defendant originally. The concurring
opinion is noted for the purpose of determining if a distinction exists between the
1. 419 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
2. Id. at 93.
3. Clark v. Quality Dairy Co., 400 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. 1966); State Highway
Commission v. Vaught, 400 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1966); Madsen v. Lawrence, 366
S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1963); Frager v. Glick, 347 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1961); Dawson v.
Scherff, 281 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. 1955); Castorina v. Herrmann, 340 Mo. 1026, 104
S.W.2d 297 (1937); Walsh v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 331 Mo. 118, 52
S.W.2d 839 (1932); Fitzjohn v. St. Louis Transit Co., 183 Mo. 74, 81 S.W. 907
(1904); Haven v. Missouri R. Co., 155 Mo. 216, 55 S.W. 1035 (1900); Chitwood
v. Davis Const. Co., 113 S.W.2d 1043 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938); Joy v. Bixby, 10
S.W.2d 342 (St. L. Mo. App. 1928).
4. Heller v. Pulitizer Pub. Co., 153 Mo. 205, 214, 54 S.W. 457, 459 (1899).
5. Lupkey v. Weldon, 419 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Mo. En Banc 1967), quotes Ukman
v. Daily Record Co., 189 Mo. 378, 390, 88 S.W. 60, 64 (1905), concerning libel cases
under our Constitution:
[If the defendant can get either the court or the jury to be in his favor,
he succeeds, while the prosecutor or plaintiff cannot succeed unless he
gets both the court and the jury to decide for him. From this condition
of things it further follows that the court may direct a non-suit, but can-
not coerce a verdict for plaintiff. ..
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granting of a new trial to the plaintiff6 on the ground that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence and the granting of a new trial to the defendant on
the same ground. If such a distinction is found to exist, consideration must be
given to its possible conflict with an often-stated concept that to grant a new
trial on the ground that the finding is against the evidence would be arbitrary if
there were no evidence to weigh.7 And, finally, if the distinction is valid, its applica-
tion to the noted case must be examined.
The determination of a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence8 is within the sound discretion of the trial
court,9 and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion
by the trial court.10 The theory behind this policy is that the trial court has access
to matters not of record (such as the demeanor of the witnesses), and is in a supe-
rior position to decide whether or not the verdict is against the weight of the evi-
dence."' Appellate courts are not afforded an opportunity to weigh the evidence
or consider its credibility; 12 their review is limited to determining whether there
has been an abuse of discretion. Thus, a trial court's order granting a new trial
motion will be upheld where there is substantial evidence to support the order;13
that is, where there is evidence to support a contrary verdict.14 It will be reversed
where no verdict for the moving party could ever be permitted to stand,' 5 or where
the non-moving party was entitled to a directed verdict.' 8
A motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence should be distinguished from a motion for a directed verdict or a
judgment n.o.z'. A motion for a new trial is sometimes used to test the sufficiency
6. Within this article, "plaintiff" is used to indicate the party with the
burden of the risk of non-persuasion of the jury. "Defendant" is used to indi-
cate the party who does not have that burden.
7. See, e.g., Castorina v. Herrmann, 340 Mo. 1026, 1032, 104 S.W.2d 297,
300 (1937).
8. Section 510.330, RSMo 1959 provides:
A new trial may be granted for any of the reasons for which new trials
have heretofore been granted. . . . Only one new trial shall be allowed
on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence ...
Supreme Court Rule 78.01 has adopted the language of that statute.
9. Andres v. Brown, 300 S.W.2d 800, 801 (Mo. 1957); Dawson v. Scherff,
281 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Mo. 1955); Weathers v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 403 S.W.2d
663, 667 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
10. State Highway Commission v. Vaught, 400 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Mo. 1966);
Madsen v. Lawrence, 366 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Mo. 1963); Haven v. Missouri R. Co.,
i55 Mo. 216, 232, 55 S.W. 1035, 1040 (1900); Joy v. Bixby, 10 S.W.2d 342, 343
(St. L. Mo. App. 1928).
11. Castorina v. Herrmann, 340 Mo. 1026, 1032, 104 S.W.2d 297, 300 (1937).
12. State Highway Commission v. Vaught, 400 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Mo. 1966);
Highway Commission v. Belvidere Development Company, 315 S.W.2d 781, 784
(Mo. 1958).
13. Andres v. Brown, 300 S.W.2d 800, 801 (Mo. 1957).
14. Schmidt v. Allen, 303 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Mo. 1967); Castorina v. Herr-
mann, 340 Mo. 1026, 1029, 104 S.W.2d 297, 299 (1937); Walsh v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 331 Mo. 118, 131, 52 S.W.2d 839, 845 (1932).'
15. Fitzjohn v. St. Louis Transit Co., 183 Mo. 74, 76, 81 S.W. 907, 908 (1904).
16. See Frager v. Glick, 347 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo. 1961).
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of the evidence,17 but the weight of the evidence is not the same as the sufficiency
of the evidence.'8 A motion for a new trial does not have the same function as a
motion for a directed verdict or judgment 'n.o.v. In considering the latter motions,
the trial court must give every benefit of inference to the non-movant. The trial
court does not actually consider credibility because that issue is resolved in favor
of the non-movant.19 On the other hand, in considering a motion for a new trial
on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the trial court
views all the evidence in the light most favorable to the moving party20 Thus, in
a case where the evidence was not such as to direct a verdict for a party, the trial
court could nevertheless grant a new trial for that party on the ground that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 2' And this is true also where the
verdict is supported by sufficient evidence.22 For example, it is conceivable that a
17. See, e.g., Dawson v. Scherff, 281 S.W.2d 825, 830 (Mo. 1955); Smith v.
J. J. Newberry Co., 395 S.W.2d 472 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965); Wood v. Walgreen
Drug Stores, Inc., 125 S.W.2d 534 (St. L. Mo. App. 1939).
18. The concept of sufficiency is directly invoked by a motion for directed
verdict or for judgment %.o.v. Sufficiency of evidence is a proposition addressed
to the court and not to the jury. The evidence is sufficient when it proves each
proposition essential to a proponent's claim to such a degree that a jury is justi-
fied in finding in the proponent's favor on the basis of that evidence. Only after a
determination of sufficiency is the jury warranted in finding for the proponent.
To that purpose the concept of credibility or weight of the evidence is but slightly
related. The court must consider credibility in ruling on motions for directed ver-
dict or judgment n.o.v. to the limited extent of determining whether the evidence
can be believed by reasonable men at all. But questions of sufficiency do not speak
to the sound discretion of the court.
In contrast to the sufficiency of the evidence, the weight of the evidence is a
matter for the jury to decide. Weight of the evidence is admittedly a vague con-
cept, but it is obviously something more than credibility (believability). Weight
is perhaps the net persuasive effect of the evidence. It is the function of the jurv
to determine the weight of the sufficient evidence and to thereby arrive at a verdict.
In considering a motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence, the trial court must consider the weight of the evi-
dence. However, it is actually a determination of credibility, and not a determina-
tion of total persuasive effect. The trial court has greater power to determine
credibility on a new trial motion than on a directed verdict motion because, in
ruling on a new trial motion on the ground that the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence, the court is not limited to a mere determination that the evidence
is not incredible as a matter of law. But the court's power to determine weight is
not as broad as the power of the jury. The court cannot substitute its judgment
as to choice of inferences for that of the jury. There is little doubt that the power
of the court to grant new trials on the ground that the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence is an inroad into the sphere of the jury. The power and duty of the
court to determine sufficiency is not.
For a thorough discussion on the interrelationships between sufficiency and
weight of the evidence see F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE, §§ 7.11, 7.13, 7.16, 7.20,
7.22 (2d ed. 1965).
19. E.g., Kap-Pel Fabrics, Inc. v. R. B. Jones & Sons, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 49
(K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
20. E.g., Trower v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co., 347 Mo. 900, 149 S.W.2d
792 (1941).
21. Ritzheimer v. Marshall, 168 S.W.2d 159, 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943).
22. Dawson v. Scherff, 281 S.W.2d 825, 830 (Mo. 1955); Ritzheimer v. Mar-
shall, 168 S.W.2d 159, 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943).
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plaintiff may offer sufficient evidence on each element of his case so that the de-
fendant is not entitled to a directed verdict. The jury's verdict for the plaintiff
would be supported by the evidence viewed in a way favorable to plaintiff, yet that
verdict could be against the weight of the evidence viewed in a way favorable to
defendant. In such a case, the trial court may grant defendant a new trial on the
ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Missouri cases do not expressly distinguish plaintiffs' motions from defend-
ants' motions for new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence. However, the concurring opinion in the Lupkey case notes that
such a distinction exists.23
When a plaintiff files a claim which is denied by the defendant, and the plain-
tiff presents evidence at trial but defendant does not, the defendant is entitled to
a verdict when the jury does not believe the plaintiff's evidence. 24 Because the
plaintiff has the risk of the non-persuasion of the jury, the defendant is entitled
to a verdict if the plaintiff fails to persuade the jury. The jury's verdict for de-
fendant can be sustained although there is no substantial evidence in his favor.
This type of situation was presented in the Lupkey case except that the jury's ver-
dict was for plaintiff. When defendant moved for a new trial, the burden of
persuasion principle would seem to be applicable. Therefore, defendant was entitled
to a new trial although there was no substantial evidence in his favor if the trial
court in its discretion found the weight of the plaintiff's evidence to be against
the plaintiff.
While no evidence in favor of defendant was produced at trial, the plaintiff
was not necessarily entitled to a directed verdict. And, significantly, a verdict
contrary to the one returned would have been permitted to stand.25 To grant
defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence is not to say that the defendant was entitled to a directed
verdict. That analysis would necessarily mean that the defendant was entitled to
a verdict, as a matter of law, upon all the evidence viewed in a light most favorable
to plaintiff. In contrast, to grant defendant's motion for a new trial is to say merely
that a verdict for the defendant would have been permitted to stand upon all he
evidence viewed in a light most favorable to defendant.
A distinction does exist between granting a plaintiff a new trial and granting
a defendant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of
the evidence. The distinction follows from the principle that the burden of per-
suasion is borne by the plaintiff. In considering weight or credibility of the evi-
dence, defendant prevails unless the plaintiff presents persuading evidence. It is
not necessary for the defendant to present any evidence.
In the Lupkey case, to grant defendant a new trial on the ground that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence was not arbitrary because of the
fact that the defendant produced no substantial evidence in his behalf at trial to
23. Lupkey v. Weldon, 419 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Mo. En Banc 1967).




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss1/13
]RECENT CASES
"weigh" against the evidence produced by the plaintiff. In Lupkey, the truth of the
plaintiff's allegations was disputed and the issue of the credibility of the plaintiff's
evidence was present. The trial court had a right to disbelieve the plaintiff's wit-
nesses.2 6 In Security Bank of Elvins v. National Surety Co.,27 the court said that
the fact that plaintiff's witnesses' testimony was not contradicted by any other
witnesses did not deprive the trial court of its well-recognized right to consider
weight and credibility when passing on a motion for a new trial.28 It is surely
helpful in weighing evidence to have conflicting evidence, but the weight of the
evidence is not determined solely by measuring it against the contradicting evi-
dence. The weight and credibility of the evidence is determined notwithstanding
the fact that there is no contrary evidence, because the plaintiff has the burden
of persuasion.
Granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence allows both parties another chance to present evidence. The purpose
of the new trial order is to do substantial justice between the parties. A plaintiff
seeking a new trial is, in effect, asking not only that his evidence be believed, but
also that the defendant's evidence, if any, be disbelieved. A defendant, on the
other hand, need only seek to have his evidence believed, or the plaintiff's evidence
disbelieved. The concurring opinion in the Lupkey case correctly points out that
it is the application of the principle of the plaintiff's burden of persuasion which
makes proper the granting motions for new trial on the ground that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence to defendants who have presented no evidence.
In Lapkey, the plaintiff asserted that the editorial complained of was libelous
per se, that truth was the only defense, and that no substantial evidence was pro-
duced to support the defense. Thus, the plaintiff could contend that, under the
analysis of the concurring opinion, the defendant is not entitied to the new trial
because the defendant has the burden of persuasion on the only defense to the
claim. While it may be true that the defendant has the burden of persuasion on
any affirmative defense, it is similarly true that such a defense does not relieve
the plaintiff of his overall burden of persuasion. If the L-upkey defendant were to
admit the allegations of the plaintiff, assert his affirmative defense, produce no
substantial evidence to support his defense, and then move for a new trial after an
unfavorable verdict, he would have the only or overall burden of persuasion and
would not be entitled to the new trial. Within the context of a motion for new
trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the de-
fendant need only convince the court that the verdict for plaintiff is against the
weight of the plaintiff's evidence. The issue of the weight of the evidence on the
affirmative defense only arises if the verdict for plaintiff is not against the weight
of the evidence. In Lwpkey the verdict for plaintiff was against the weight of the
evidence produced to support the plaintiff's claim. Therefore, the affirmative de-
fense was of no concern.
26. State Highway Commission v. Vaught, 400 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Mo. 1966);
Birdsong v. Jones, 225 Mo. App. 242, 245, 30 S.W.2d 1094, 1097 (K.C. Ct. App.
1930).
27. 333 Mo. 340, 62 S.W.2d 708 (1933).
28. Id. at 341.
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The concurring opinion in Lupkey v. Weldon29 correctly stated that the de-
fendant was entitled to a new trial order on the basis of general procedure princi-
ples. Therefore, it was not necessary for the majority opinion to rely on the, libel
provisions in the Constitution to reach their decision.
BARBARA JILL BREDEMAN
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY FOR RENT AFTER
DESTRUCTION OF BUILDING-LEASE OF PART OF BUILDING
Crow Lumber and Building Materials Co. v. Washington County Library Board'
Defendant, tenant, leased from plaintiff, landlord, "the street level floor only"
of a certain building. The building contained a basement which was used by the
landlord for storage. The lease contained neither covenants by the landlord to
rebuild nor provisions excusing the tenant from paying rent if the building was
destroyed or made untenantable. Nine months before the expiration of the term
the building was made untenantable by an accidental fire. The tenant did not pay
the rent for the remaining nine months and landlord brought suit to recover the
back rent. The trial court entered judgment for the tenant and was affirmed by
the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals recognized that Missouri courts have consistently en-
forced the general common law rule that in the absence of a provision excusing
the lessee, he must continue to pay rent even if the demised premises are destroyed
or made untenantable by accidental causes.2 The court noted, however, that this
general rule had only been applied in Missouri where the leasehold was for more
than a portion of a building.3 Considering the principal case one of first impression,
4
the court adopted an exception to the general rule: when the leasehold is for only
a portion of the building and the building is accidentally destroyed or made un-
tenantable the tenancy ceases and the lessee is no longer liable for the rent.
5
The general rule that the lessee must pay rent even though the premises
become untenantable has a long history. It was recognized over three centuries
ago in the English case of Paradine v. Jane,6 and almost two hundred years ago
29. 419 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
1. 428 S.W.2d 758 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
2. Id. at 760-61.
3. Id. at 760.
4. Id. at 759.
5. Id. at 764. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.103 (A. Casner ed.
1952), H. LAZAR, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3.103 (1957), 3A G. THOMPSON, COM-
MENTARIES OF THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1299 (Repl. 1959), 1 H.
TIFFANY, ThE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 154, 905 (3d ed. 1939), 2 R. POWELL,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 233(3) (1967).
6. 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
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in the American case of Pollard v. Shaaffer.7 Both cases reasoned that since the
lessee had made the covenant to pay rent, and could have protected himself in the
lease, the court could not excuse him from performance because of "any accident
by inevitable necessity."s Paradine and Pollard also said that since the lessee could
enjoy the advantage of casual or accidental profits he should bear the risk of
casual losses.9
Missouri courts recognized the general rule as early as 1852 in Davis' Admin-
istrator v. Smith. & Bradley.1o The court in Davis followed the reasoning of
Paradine and Pollard and added that a lease should be viewed as a purchase of
the demised premises for the term of the lease. Therefore, the lessee should bear
the loss occasioned by the destruction as any owner would.1' This reasoning was
followed in subsequent Missouri cases, 2 but later the rule was reapplied without
mention of its underlying reasons.' 3 Although the Missouri courts have continued
to uphold the rule, they have criticized it strongly as being unduly harsh.' 4
Perhaps to alleviate this harshness some American courts developed an ex-
ception which excuses payment of rent if the lease involved only a portion of a
building. In 1832, the Supreme Court of Ohio said in Winton v. Cornish'5 that a
lessee's interest in one room and the cellar of a house was terminated when the
entire house was destroyed by fire. The court reasoned that since the only interest
which the lessee had was in a part of the building and not in the land the de-
struction of the building left nothing on which the lease could operate.' 6 This rea-
soning has been accepted by many courts.1 7
In the principal case the court of appeals adopted the reasoning of Winton and
said "the lease of the 'street level floor only' of the building did not grant any
7. 1 Dallas 210, 1 Am. Dec. 239 (Pa. 1787). Both Paradine and Pollard in-
volved demised premises which the lessee was unable to use during the term of the
lease because they were occupied by enemy troops.
8. Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897,897 (K.B. 1647).
9. Id. at 897; Pollard v. Shaaffer, 1 Dallas 210, 1 Am. Dec. 239, 245 (Pa.
1787).
10. Davis' Adm'r v. Smith & Bradley, 15 Mo. 467 (1852).
11. Id. at 469-70. It should be noted that the property aspect of a modern
lease is often overlooked since the contract aspect looms so large. In a lease, the
landlord transfers to the tenant a possessory interest for the term, and if there is
a casualty destruction two property interests are destroyed, the tenant's term for
years and the landlord's reversion in fee.
12. Gibson v. Perry, 29 Mo. 245 (1860); O'Neil v. Flanagan, 64 Mo. App.
87 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895).
13. Sedalia Planing Mill & Lumber Co. v. Swift & Co., 129 Mo. App. 471, 107
S.W. 1093 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908).
14. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Nathan, 175 Mo. 32, 74 S.W. 1007 (1903); Kennedy
v. Watts, 142 Mo. App. 103, 125 S.W. 211 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910).
15. 5 Ohio 477 (1832).
16. Id. at 478-80.17. See, e.g., Buerger v. Boyd, 25 Ark. 441 (1869); Signal v. Wise, 114 Conn.
297, 158 A. 891 (1932); Harrington v. Watson, 11 Or. 143, 3 P. 173 (1883); Por-
ter v. Tull, 6 Wash. 408, 33 P. 965 (1893); Waite v. O'Neil, 76 F. 408 (6th Cir.
1896). The soundness of this distinction between the building and the land can be
questioned. For most purposes buildings are treated as part of the land.
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interest in the land."18 As a result, the lease was terminated by the destruction
and the tenant's liability for the rent ended.' 9 While this reasoning covers apart-
ment and many office and storeroom leases and may reach a more just result than
that reached by the old general rule, the case uses an indirect approach where
a more direct approach is needed. The better reason for the exception would seem
to be to alleviate the harshness of the old general rule. And if this is the object,
the old rule should be dealt with in a more direct manner.20 For example, several
states have passed statutes which either partially or entirely excuse the lessee
from paying rent when the premises are destroyed.21 Others have accomplished
similar results by court decisions. 22 Missouri courts, using a somewhat indirect ap-
proach, weakened the common law rule by excusing payment of rent where the
lessor did not honor a covenant to rebuild2 3 or failed to provide insurance for
the premises as he had covenanted.2 4
The use of the exception to ease the harshness of the general rule may lead
to difficulties. For instance, the lease may purport to be only of the whole building
and not of the land. A District of Columbia case has said that if the building was
destroyed under this type of lease the tenant would be excused from paying his
rent.25 Missouri, on the other hand, in McDaniel v. Wilier 6 has said that a lease
which purports on its face to lease only the building and makes no reference to
the land will be deemed to include the land on which the building stands and any
land necessary to the building's proper use.27 This recognition of some interest in
the land would mean that the above execption could not apply. There would also
be a problem if the lease was for a building built in the air space above another
18. Crow Lumber & Bldg. Materials Co. v. Washington County Library Board,
428 S.W.2d at 764.
19. Ibid.
20. Few courts have offered functional reasons for this exception, although
some could be advanced. For example, in the Winton case the court refused to
allow 'the tenant to rebuild on the foundation of the destroyed house in which he
had rented one room and the cellar. This would indicate that where the tenant
rents the whole of a lot and the improvements thereon, he should have to pay in
the event of destruction because he may rebuild or make some other use of the
lot. On the other hand, a tenant who rents only a portion of a building should not
have to pay because he is not entitled to rebuild or make other use of the premises
after their destruction.
21. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1933 (West 1956); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 277. However, Georgia has codified the old common law rule in GA. CODE § 63-113(1933).
22. Wattles v. Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N.W. 785 (1897);
Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674 (1881), using strong language against the com-
mon law rule but deciding the case on the ground that the lease substantially in-
volved personal property; Coogan v. Parker, 2 S.C. 255 (1870), modifying the
common law rule so as to excuse payment of rent if lessee rescinds the lease and
surrenders the premises after their destruction.
23. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Nathan, 175 Mo. 32, 74 S.W. 1007 (1903).
24. Wittmeyer v. Storms, 203 S.W. 237 (K.C. Mo. App. 1918).
25. Schmidt v. Petit, 8 D.C. (1 MacArthur) 179 (1873).
26. 216 S.W.2d 144 (St. L. Mo. App. 1948).
27. Id. at 146.
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building or other improvements in -a large city28 and the upper building was de-
stroyed. Would the doctrine of Sclmidt or of McDaniel apply? Or what if the
entire demised premises including land were washed away by a river? One court
in such a case has said that since the subject of the lease was destroyed and there
was no longer anything for the lease to operate on, the lease was terminated,
excusing the lessee from paying further rents.29
It appears that the best solution to the problem would be to abolish com-
pletely the old common law rule and excuse the lessee from payment of rent when-
ever the demised premises are destroyed or made untenantable °30 Short of this,
however, the attorney can avoid the problem completely by using a well drafted
lease which clearly defines the rights and liabilities of both parties in the event
the demised premises are destroyed or made untenantable during the term of the
lease.8 1
ROBERT HICKEL
THE QUASHING OF SUBPOENAS OF DOCUMENTS LOCATED ABROAD-
WHAT GOVERNS?
United States v. First National City Bank'
Defendant First National City Bank of New York (hereinafter called Citibank)
was served with a subpoena duces tecum requiring production of documents, among
which were records kept at Citibank's Frankfort, Germany branch. Defendant re-
fused to produce the German records, contending that should it comply with the
subpoena, it would be faced with possible civil liability and economic loss in Ger-
many.2 For failing to produce the documents, the district court adjudged Citibank
28. An example is the new Madison Square Gardens in New York over the
site of the old Pennsylvania station.
29. Waite v. O'Neil, 76 F. 408 (6th Cir. 1896).
30. A rejection of the old rule would need to provide for the situation where
the majority of the value of the demised premises is not destroyed by the de-
struction of a building thereon. For example, the tenant should not be excused from
payment of rent upon a farm on which only a single building is destroyed.
31. See, e.g., E. BELSHEIM, MODERN LEGAL Forsts § 5071 et seq. (1962);
5 C. NICHOLS, CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL Foaxas § 5.1866 et seq. (1956); 7 P. PnmE-
SON & W. EcKHArr, Missouni PRA CricE LEGAL FoRMs § 891 et seq. (1960); and
any other good form book on leases.
1. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
2. Expert testimony established the nature of the "bank secrecy law" of
Germany. The opinion stated:
a bank-including a foreign bank (such as Citibank) licensed to do
business in Germany--cannot divulge information relating to the affairs of
its customers even in response to the process of a court of the United
States. To do so... would amount to a breach of the bank's 'self evident'
contractual obligation which flows from the business relationship between
19691,
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to be in civil contempt s The bank was fined $2,000 per day and the bank's vice-
president was sentenced to sixty days' imprisonment.4 The United States Court
of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed, holding that the mere possibility of civil
liability was insufficient grounds for refusing to comply with the subpoena. The
court found that Citibank did not make a good faith attempt to comply with the
subpoena,5 and the proof of prospective civil liability was wholly speculative 0 The
opinion concluded:
If indeed Citibank might suffer civil liability under German law in such
circumstances, it must confront the choice . . . [of needing] . . . to "sur-
render to one sovereign or the other the privileges received therefrom,"
or alternatively, a willingness to accept the consequences. 7
This case is indicative of the dilemma often faced by banks, corporations, and
individuals who do business on an international scale.
As a general rule, a court may direct a party or witness over whom it has in
personam jurisdiction to produce documents under that person's control, even
though those documents are located abroad.8 The cases, however, agree that it is
bank and customer. . . . and secrecy . . . (is) . . . not a part of the
statutory law of Germany, rather it was in the nature of a privilege ...
United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 899 (2d Cir. 1968).
In addition, the bank was threatened with economic reprisals:
The customer "... informed Citibank that it would have to 'suffer the con-
sequences' if it obeyed the subpoena. It was suggested that Bochringer
(customer) would sue the bank for breach of contract and would also
use its influence within German industrial circles to cause Citibank to
suffer business losses." Id. at 899.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(f), "Contempt-Failure by any person without excuse
to obey a subpoena served on him may be deemed a contempt of the court from
which the subpoena was issued." FED. R. CalM. P. 17(g) is substantially the same.
See also Taylor v. U.S., 221 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1955), holding that disobedience
of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum is punishable as a contempt of court.
4. The sentence is not as harsh as it appears. The punishment could not ex-
tend beyond the expiration date of the grand jury, which was apparently substan-
tially less than sixty days. See Loubriel v. U.S., 9 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1926); U.S.
v. Collins, 146 F. 553 (D. Ore. 1906). Query: would the court have affirmed the sen-
tence of the vice-president had he faced, in reality, a 60-day sentence?
5. United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968),
note 8 at 900.
6. Id. at 900.
7. Id. at 905.
8. U.S. v. First National City Bank (Omar), 379 U.S. 378 (1965); In re In-
vestigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952); Societe Inter-
nationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); U.S. v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir.
1962); In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry, 186 F. Supp. 298
(D.D.C. 1960); First National City Bank v. I.R.S., 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied 361 U.S. 948; SEC v. Minas de Artimisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir.
1945); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW, § 53 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967); See also Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 295 (1962); Note, 63 CoLuM.
L. REv. 1441 (1963).
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improper for a United States court to order such disclosure if the disclosure would
be in violation of the law of the foreign country;9 and a party to whom a subpoena
duces tecwm is issued may move to quash the subpoena on those grounds.' 0 The
duty of the court in this instance is to determine if and when the motion should
be granted, and how relief can be structured so as to minimize the hardship on the
parties concerned. The Citibank case is the latest in a series of decisions defining
the factors a court should weigh in disposing of such a motion.
The early cases in this area dealt with the problem in terms of absolutes. In
a 1914 decision, Munroe v. United States,11 the court vacated the subpoena because
the cost of production of records located in Paris was prohibitive, and it would
be placing upon defendant an unconscionable burden to require him to superintend
the documents during a perilous Atlantic crossing. In the post-war Prize Cases,'
2
the Prize Courts of Great Britain held that dismissal of a cause of action was
proper when an order to produce records physically located in Sweden was
refused on the grounds that to do so would place plaintiffs in violation of
Swedish penal law. In The Consid Corfitzon'3 in 1917, the opinion states, ". . . a
court of Prize cannot properly be deterred from making what it conceives
to be the appropriate order because a neutral claimant would, if he obeyed
the order, be guilty of a breach of his own municipal law."' 4 The disposi-
iion of these cases curiously reflects the teior of the international economic and
political scene during the wane of the age of imperialism.
In more recent times advances in the areas of transportation and communi-
cation have caused international business relationships to flourish as never before.
With this increase in economic-and necessarily political-contact, the need for
a more sophisticated approach to problems of international legal conflicts is obvious.
Many countries have laws and policies which forbid the disclosure or removal of
business records from the country. In Switzerland, the law is very strict, since bank
secrecy is the foundation of Swiss economic importance. On the other hand, the
securities control and antitrust laws express the strong public policy of the United
States, and enforcement of these laws cannot be thwarted by the law of another
9. SEC v. Minas de Artimisa, 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945); In re Reicher,
159 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); First National City Bank v. I.R.S., 271 F.2d
616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 948; Societe Internationale v. Rogers
357 U.S. 197 (1958); In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1959); In re In-
vestigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45 (b).
11. 216 F. 107 (1st Cir. 1914).
12. The Consul Cortifzon, [19172 A.C. 550; Steamship Antilla, 7 Lloyd's
Prize Cases 401; The Baron Stjernblad, [19182 A.C. 173; Kronprinsessan Mar-
gareta, 6 Lloyd's Prize Cases 105; Kronprinsessan Victoria, [19192 A.C. 261.
13. [19172 A.C. 550.
14. "The position (of the Swedish plaintiffs] is anomalous, but the anomaly
is certainly not due to the practice of the Prize Court." From the Baron Stjernblad
[19182 A.C. 173, 179.
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country.15 Thus, the courts have had the job of balancing the interests16 of the
United States, the foreign sovereign, and the party to whom the order was issued.
The procedural requirements for a party or witness seeking to avail himself
of non-compliance with a court order on these grounds are twofold. First, he must
show that a good faith attempt has been made on his part 17 to comply with the
order.'8 This may entail ordering production by foreign employees or officers, 19
requesting waiver by the foreign sovereign of penalties under the foreign law,20
or by requesting permission of foreign authorities to remove or copy the doc-
uments. 21 In addition, there must be proof of foreign law.22 A party must
show what law will be violated should the terms of the subpoena be carried
out. Experts may be called in23 and statutory text may be presented; 24 in short,
the court must be fully apprised of the effects of the foreign law.
The courts have generally tended to respect the foreign relations power of the
executive branch of our government, and have tried to avoid any conflict with a
foreign sovereign. If the sovereign has expressed an active interest in preventing the
removal of documents in a specific case, a court is not likely to require a helpless
petitioner to comply. Perhaps the most famous decision in this regard is the Inter-
handle case25 where the records sought were seized by an official of the Swiss gov-
15. For examples of such "thwarting," see, Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland
Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618 (C.A.), denying enforcement of an American discovery
order; British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1954]
3 All E.R. 88 (Ch. 1954), denying enforcement of contract pursuant to order of
an American court.
16. RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrrED
STATES § 40; U.S. v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967). In
U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F.R.D. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), the court said, ". . . the
burden upon the defendants in producing the documents or answering the inter-
rogatories must be weighed against the necessity of the documents and information
to the government ....
17. In the Citibank case, Citibank made no effort even to inquire of its Ger-
man branch about the records.
18. U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); U.S. v. First
National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal
Maritime Board, 295 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961); In re Investigation of World
Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
19. In re Reicher, 159 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
20. Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953),
aff'd sub. nom.; Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
rev'd on other grounds sub. nor.; Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197
(1958).
21. SEC v. Minas de Artimisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945); U.S. v.
Ross, 302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962).
22. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952);
Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1959).
23. SEC v. Minas de Artimisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945); U.S. v.
First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); Application of Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1959).
24. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 44.1 and advisory committee's notes thereto.
25. Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953),
aff'd rub. nom., 225 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1955), rev'd sub. npm., 357 U.S. 197 (1958);
Plaintiff is also known as "I.G. Chemie," and more popularly as "Interhandle."
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emnment 26 in order to preclude production pursuant to a discovery order of a
United States court. Compliance was a practical impossibility, and the United
States Supreme Court vacated the order on these grounds.27 In Application of the
Chase Manhattan Bank,28 the interest of the foreign sovereign was expressed in a
different, but no less direct, manner. Subsequent to the court's production order,
the Panamanian government passed legislation which prohibited removal of business
records. This positive expression moved the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit to relieve the bank of the burden of production. In Canada, stat-
utes have been passed prohibiting removal of business records for examination in
foreign tribunals, and American courts, in response thereto, have not required
production of documents located in Canada.29
In the Citibank case, the court noted, and apparently deemed important, the
fact that no opposition to the production of the records was presented by the
German government. The court presumed that since there was no intervention
by the State Department (the government was plaintiff), the requirement of pro-
duction would not constitute judicial encroachment upon executive powers.
26. The seizure was made under Article 273, Swiss PENAL CODE (economic
espionage), and Article 47, Swiss BANKING LAw (bank secrecy).
27. The court stated that the dismissal power in Rule 37 should not be used
"...when it has been established that failure to comply has been due to inability,
and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner." Societe Internationale
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
28. 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
29. The litigation in regard to materials located in Canada has been vigorous,
and the United States courts have largely refrained from stretching the bounds'
of international comity. In an early case, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Addressed To Canadian International Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y.
1947), the board of directors of a Canadian corporation passed a resolution which
declared the records private and said that they could not be removed from
Canada. This was asserted as a legally sufficient reason for quashing a subpoena
duces tecunim issued from a federal Grand Jury. The court stated on page 1020 of
the opinion: "The corporation may not evade complying with the subpoena by a
resolution of this character . . . ." The motion to quash was denied.
Largely in response to this decision, the CANADIAN BUSINESs REcoRDs PROTEC-
TIONS ACr, 1 Ontario Rev. Stat. (1960), ch. 44, pp. 421422, was adopted. The
main portions are:
1. No person shall, pursuant to or under or in a manner that would be
consistent with compliance with any requirement, order, direction, or
subpoena of any legislative, administrative, or judicial authority in any
jurisdiction outside Ontario, take or cause to be taken, send or cause to be
sent, or remove or cause to be removed from a point in Ontario to a point
outside Ontario, any account, balance sheet, profit and loss statement, or
inventory or any resume or digest thereof or any record, statement, report
or material in any way relating to any business carried on in Ontario....
2. (2) Every person who, having received notice of an application under
this section, contravenes this Act shall be deemed to be in contempt of
court and liable to one year's imprisonment.
In the subsequent case of Hirshhorn v. Hirshhorn, 278 App. Div. 1006, 105,
N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 1951), the court denied inspection and discovery of
documents and records in Canada because of the Canadian Business Records Pro.;
tection Act, and stated that such discovery should be sought in Ontario.
19691
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The availability of alternative forms of relief has influenced the disposition of
a motion to vacate. When the courts have been able to structure relief somewhere
between the extremes of a total quashing on one hand and a contempt citation
on the other, they have done so. Production orders have been modified in several
ways to accommodate the interests of both parties to the suit. In SEC v. Minas de
Artimisa, S.A.,30 the Ninth Circuit directed movant to apply to the appropriate
Mexican authorities for permission to copy records located there, the removal of
which would constitute a violation of Mexican law. The order provided that if
such permission was not forthcoming, the SEC would have to examine the books
at the SEC's expense in Mexico. A similar shifting of the burden of production is
found in the order of the court in Chase Manhattan. Upon proof of foreign law,
compliance was no longer required, and "the next move is up to the government,"31
presumably meaning that the government had to petition the Panamanian courts
for permission to remove the documents if it was to see them at all. In modifying
an order to produce records in Canada,3 2 the court in Ings v. FergusonM3 suggested
recourse in Canadian courts was the only way documents located in Canada could
be procured when their removal was prohibited by Canadian law.
Probably the most important consideration examined by the courts is the
nature of the foreign law which movant claims he will violate should he comply
with the subpoena. Clearly, the threat of criminal sanctions abroad constitutes a
legally sufficient basis for a motion to quash.34 Whether the sanction involves fines
or penal consequences is immaterial, and presumably the severity of the criminal
sanction is irrelevant. Chase Manhattan held that an offense which was similar to
the common law concept of misdemeanor was sufficient.
Prior to the Citibank case, there was no indication whether prospective civil
liability abroad is also sufficient reason to quash a production order. The question
was raised in Chase Manhattan, but was left unanswered. 35 The facts of Citibank
offered the Second Circuit the opportunity to answer it. This was done in an in-
direct manner, for the significance of Citibank lies not in the holding of the case,
but rather in the dictum.36
The Citibank decision holds merely that on the facts, Citibank did not meet
the good faith and proof of law requirements-that they did not "show cause why
30. 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
31. 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962).
32. In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
33. 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
34. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); Application of
Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. Minas de Artimisa,
S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
35. Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962).
"The Government also argues that First National City Bank stands for the propo-
sition that the foreign law prohibiting production must provide criminal sanctions
to justify the court in modifying the subpoena. But we need not now decide
whether the sanctions must always be criminal."
36. The dictum is significant because most of these cases dealing with inter-
national business transactions are litigated in the Second Circuit, and because the
language of the court gives a strong indication of how future cases may be decided.
[Vol. 34
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they should not produce the documents.37 The dictum indicates, however, that
the court finds a civil-criminal distinction in this area a cumbersome tool, and that
in the future, civil liability may, in some cases, be grounds for refusal to comply
with a subpoena duces tecum.3s The court does not go so far as to promulgate
a formula to be followed, but it makes clear the deficiency in the case presented
by Citibank. The liability must be reasonably certain. The court felt that this was
not established, finding that Citibank had several defenses available to it.P It is
therefore a fair conclusion that if a party can show that compliance with an order
to produce foreign records gives rise to a cause of action under foreign law, to
which compulsion by an American court is no defense, the party will be excused
from compliance, whether the foreign liability is categorized as civil or criminal.
The Citibank decision restricts, in one sense, the power of its process. However,
it has provided a solid foothold upon which to base further developments in the
area of foreign civil liability as a basis for a motion to quash orders for the pro-
duction of documents located abroad.
KENNETH W. JOHNSON
37. See U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), and In re
Reicher, 159 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), both holding that a contempt proceed.
ing is a proper place to litigate questions of goud faith.
38. United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968)
at 902.
We would be reluctant to hold, however, that the mere absence of crim-
inal sanctions abroad necessarily mandates obedience to a subpoena.
Such a rule would show scant respect for international comity; . . . . It
would be a gross fiction to contend that if the Bundesbank were to revoke
the license of Citibank for a violation of bank secrecy the impact would
be less catastrophic than having to pay an insignificant fine because the
revocation is theoretically not "equivalent to a misdemeanor" or criminal
sanction. We are not required to decide whether penalties must be under
the "criminal law" to provide a legally sufficient reason for noncompli-
ance with a subpoena; but, it would seem unreal to let all hang on whether
the label "criminal" were attached to the sanction and to disregard all
other factors. In any event, even were we to assume arguendo that in
appropriate circumstances civil penalties or liabilities would suffice, we hold
that Citibank has failed to provide an adequate justification for its dis-
obedience of the subpoena.
39. United States v. National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, note 6 at p. 900.
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INTERNAL REVENUE-ALLOCATION OF PURCHASE
PRICE TO UNIQUE INVENTORY
lack Daniel Distillery v. United States1
The taxpayer, a newly-formed Tennessee corporation, acquired for cash and
negotiable promissory notes all the stock of a predecessor Tennessee corporation
and subsequently liquidated the old corporation thereby acquiring all its assets and
assuming its liabilities. The new corporation carried on the whiskey distillery busi-
ness previously operated by the old corporation.
The purchase and liquidation were executed in accordance with the provisions
of section 334(b) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 This section provides
that the basis to the acquiring corporation of the property received on liquidation
shall be the adjusted basis of the stock with respect to which the distribution was
made. The adjusted basis of the stock is allocated among the tangible and intangible
assets acquired in proportion to their net fair market value3 when received.4
This was a suit in the United States Court of Claims for refund of corporation
income tax paid and interest thereon for the fiscal periods ended April 30, 1958
through 1962. The Commissioner asserted that the cost basis allocated to whiskey
inventory and depreciable property was overstated, and thus, income was under-
1. 379 F.2d 569 (Ct. C. 1967).
2. Upon liquidation of a subsidiary under § 332(b), the assets received by
the parent generally carry over the basis they had in the hands of the subsidiary.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 334(b) (1). This means that the inherited basis might
be more or less than the price paid for the stock. Prior to 1954, cases developed
the principle that a purchase by one corporation of all or substantially all of the
stock of another corporation, followed by a liquidation of the acquired corporation,
produced a basis equal to the cost of stock rather than a carry over of basis. This
was called the "single transaction" doctrine. Kimbell-Diamond Milline Co. v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951). In 1954, the
doctrine was embodied in 334(b) (2) as an exception, providing that the parent
corporation's basis for property acquired in the liquidation of a controlled sub-
sidiary is the cost of the stock rather than the subsidiary's basis if: (1) at least
80% of the stock is acquired, (2) by "purchase" (as defined), (3) during a period
of not more than 12 months, (4) and if distribution is pursuant to a plan of com-
plete liquidation under § 332 adopted not more than two years after the purchase.
Because in theory the transaction is a purchase, the parent does not inherit the
liquidated corporation's earnings and profits as it would in a normal liquidation.
These formal steps are controlling regardless of the acquiring corporation's purpose
or intent. B. B1TrKER AND J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 375-76 (2d ed. 1966).
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1 (c) (4) (viii) (1955). None of the assets was subject
to a mortgage or pledge so fair market value and net fair market value were the
same in this case.
4. This required allocation is similar to the rule set down in Williams v.
McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945). There several assets constituting a going
concern were sold by an individual proprietor. The court held that the proceeds
must be allocated among the various assets to determine the nature of any gains or
losses. The buyer is also required to allocate his cost among the assets received.
Note, 13 TAX. L. REv. 369 (1958).
[Vol. 34
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stated. Upon trial the government reduced its dispute over the allocation of cost
to the amounts allocated to the unbottled whiskey inventory and goodwill.5 The
valuations given the two principal assets in dispute by the parties were as follows:
Cost to old
Jack Daniel Commissioner Taxpayer
Unbottled whiskey $3.2 million $3.8 million $11.6 million
Goodwill -0- $6.7 million $ 2.5 million
The Commissioner assigned deficiencies totaling $3.5 million for the taxable
years 1958 through 1962. The deficiencies resulted from the use of the old Jack
Daniel cost basis for the assets in computing cost of goods sold and allowances for
depreciation of the assets acquired from the old corporation. The taxpayer used
insurance values in determining its basis in inventory and consequent income tax
liability for the same taxable periods. 6 The Court of Claims held that the tax-
payer's valuation of the whiskey inventory constituted the fair market value of
such inventory and was the proper basis for cost of goods sold.7 Thus, the-claim
for refund was allowed.8
5. Another issue involved in the case was whether or not the residual method
of valuing goodwill was acceptable. This is the method whereby the tangible assets
are first valued and then goodwill is given the value of the excess of purchase
price over the allocation to the tangibles. An alternative method would be to
analyze the earnings of the business and value goodwill by capitalizing earnings
considered to be in excess of a fair return on the tangible assets. See Crawford,
Allocation of Goodwill In a Section 334(b)('2) Liquidation: Which Method May
Be Used?, 26 J. OF TAx. 204 (1967). The court in Jack Daniel determined that
where the tangible assets are capable of definite valuation the residual method of
valuing goodwill is acceptable. Jack Daniel Distillery v. United States, 379 F.2d
569, 579 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The residual method was used in: Cohen v. Kelm, 119
F. Supp. 376 (D. Minn. 1953); Motel Co. v. Commissioner, 22 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 825 (1963), aff'd, 340 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1965); Copperhead Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, 272 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1959).
6. There are clear motives behind these positions. If the government could
have successfully argued that $6.7 million should be allocated to goodwill then
taxable income could have been increased. Plaintiff, on the other hand, can benefit
by allocating relatively large amounts to the inventory. This makes the cost of
goods sold figure higher and stated income lower. In cases other than § 332(b)
situations there is also a conflict over allocation between buyer and seller. In
those cases seller would like to allocate large amounts to intangibles which are
considered capital assets when sold. Note, 13 TAx. L. REV. 369, 370 (1958).
7. Upon trial, the government had added a "future worth factor" of $.6
million, computed at 6.5% per year on the cost of inventory on the books of old
Jack Daniel. This made the government's total valuation $3.8 million. The "future
worth factor" was intended to take into account interest on the orizinal investment
and the storage and other charges incurred on the whiskey as it matured. The
court rejected this as completely arbitrary in that it ignored the market concept.
Equating cost with fair market value of the whiskey was viewed as "grossly in-
consistent" with the seller's market for Jack Daniel. Tack Daniel Distillery v.
United States, 379 F.2d 569, 578 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
In South Lake Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1027 (1961), aff'd, 324
F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963), there was a sale of stock to a new corporation which
liquidated the old corporation and obtained a stepped-up basis in assets. The old
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Prior to 1956, the distilling industry had entered into an agreement with in-
surance underwriters to use a method of valuing "irreplaceable whiskey"9 for in-
surance purposes that was different from that used for whiskey sold on the bulk
whiskey market. This was done because it was believed that the market price of
bulk whiskey did not adequately reflect the value of an irreplaceable whiskey.
The method used by underwriters was to take the case price of the whiskey in
glass bottles and subtract the excise taxes, bottling costs, and other unincurred
charges. This valuation was made prior to any negotiations pertaining to the sale
of. the old Jack Daniel stock between seller and purchaser.
The taxpayer presented the following factors in support of its valuation. First,
old Jack Daniel proposed the insurance value as being the fair market value of
the unbottled inventory and this value was accepted by the purchaser.' 0 Second,
regular independent auditors had determined that a purchase of the whiskey in-
ventory at the insurance values would yield a substantial before-tax profit, and
that the valuation was therefore a reasonable one." Third, three officers of other
distillery and whiskey wholesale companies testified that in their opinion, the,
insurance valuation was the fair market value of the unbottled inventory. Two
of the expert witnesses testified that in 1956, they would willingly have purchased,
corporation took deductions for the cost of planting crops while the new corpora-.
tion 'took the cost of harvesting the same crops as a deduction. Both corporations
reported net losses in the year. The Commissioner attempted to charge the old
corporation with proceeds from the sale of crops by purchaser. The Tax Court
rejected this view saying that the cost of planting was included in the value of
assets sold to the purchaser, and thus, the proceeds of the sale were not includable
in income to the seller. In the Jack Daniel case the government apparently wanted
to prevent any stepped-up basis since the proceeds of a later sale could not be
charged to the liquidated corporation. The language of § 334(b) (2) however,
clearly provides for the stepped-up basis.
8. The Court considered the following facts as relevant to its decision. Jack
Daniel whiskey was what is known in the distilling industry as an "irreplaceable
whiskey," unique in its reputation for a distinctive taste. It had never been sold
on the bulk whiskey markets. At the time of the acquisition it was considered the
most distinctive of the famous bourbons because the method by which it was
processed gave it a taste unlike any other whiskey on the market. Jack Daniels
Distillery v. United States, 379 F.2d 569, 572 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
9. See footnote 8 supra.
10. In McGuire v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 801 (1965), testimony of an in-
surance broker as to the insurance valuation of property was used in determining
fair market value. In Pickering v. Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 670, 672 (1926), a case
in which the value of tangible property of a newspaper was in issue, an appraisal
was made for insurance and accounting purposes prior to litigation. It was held
that this appraisal alone supported petitioner's burden of proof as to establishing a
different figure than that asserted by the Commissioner.
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2 (1958) provides:
(a) Section 471 provides two tests to which each inventory must conform:
(1) It must conform as nearly as may be to the best accounting prac-
tice in the trade or business, and
(2) It must clearly reflect the income.
(b) It follows, therefore, that inventory rules cannot be uniform but must
, give effect to trade customs which come within the scope of the best
accounting practice in the particular trade or business.
[Vol. 34,
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or participated in a joint enterprise to purchase, the Jack Daniel inventory at the
insurance value, assuming that they would have had the right to sell the same
under Jack Daniel labels. The Court of Claims concluded that the testimony was
convincing that the inventory could have been sold to a third party at the insur-
ance valuation if the purchasers were given the right to use the Jack Daniel labels.
The first important issue raised concerns the use of net realizable value (insur-
ance value) as an acceptable measure of fair market value. It has been stated that
fair market value is the price at which property would change hands in a transac-
tion between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under compul-
sion to buy or sell, and both being reasonably informed as to the facts.1 2 This means,
that fair market value must be based on the best possible use of the subject mat-
ter. s Under circumstances where it was clear that a loss on sale of inventory was to
be incurred, the United States Tax Court in Space Controls, Inc.14 approved an in-
ventory revaluation below cost at net realizable value.15 Inventory valuation at cur.
rent selling values less direct costs of disposition has been approved in connection
with livestock and farm products.' 6 In special situations such valuations are also
accepted as good accounting practice.17 In holding for the taxpayer in the Jack
12. Wood v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 853, 89 Ct. Cl. 442 (1939); 10 J. MER-
TENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 59.01 (1964). That a market value
can be established without market sales, see Gordon, What Is Fair Market Value?,
8 TAx. L. REv. 35, 59 (1952).
13. In Gordon, What Is Fair Market Value?, 8 TAX. L. REv. 35, 36 (1952).
it is stated that: "Fair market value in essence means sound value: it is the price
for which the owner would hold out if he could." 10 1. MmTEs, FEDERAL INCOME
TAX ATION § 59.01 (1964) provides: "An important element in the value of property
is the use to which it may be put."
14. 21 T.C.M. 295 (1962), rev'd in part, Space Controls, Inc. v. Commission-
er, 322 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1963). The issue on appeal was whether goods in process
could be revalued below cost in addition to completed inventory once it was certain
that a loss on each item was to be incurred. The Commissioner contended that
market, as used the lower-of-cost-or-market formula, was not what the products
were to be sold for, but what the costs of production were including raw materials,
labor and burden. The Tax Court held for the Commissioner on this issue but was
reversed, the court of appeals finding that Treas. Reg. § 1.471-4(b) (1958), per-
mitted the taxpayer to reduce the inventory in process to its net realizable value.
15. The concept of net realizable value was also approved as the proper
method for determining fair market value of inventory in Berg v. United States,
167 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Wisc. 1958). Inventory value was set at the price for
which it could be sold less necessary costs of disposal and dealer's discounts.
16. Treas. Reg. § 1-471-6(d) (1958), provides that farmers may elect to value
their products according to the "farm-price method" which follows the net selling
price principle.
17. In W. PATON, ADVANCED Accoum'ING, 160 (8th ed. 1954), it is stated:
Net selling price . . . has some standing in practice as a basis for the
valuation of special kinds of inventories. By 'net price' in this connec-
tion is generally meant current selling value less estimated costs still to
be met in preparing goods for sale and in effecting sale and delivery.
In H. FINNEY AND H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING, 220 (6th ed. 1965),
it is stated that:
valuation of the inventory at selling prices less a provision for disposal
costs is often regarded as acceptable practice if production costs are dif-
ficult to determine and the product has a ready marketability.
1969] 1
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Daniel case the Court of Claims made it clear that the government's method of
valuation, being based on cost to the seller, completely ignored the market con-
cept involved in the term fair market value.'8
The second important issue was whether the right to use the Jack Daniel label
to market the whiskey was an incident of ownership which could be included in
the fair market value of the unbottled whiskey. Because the cost of acquiring a
trademark is considered a capital expenditure for an intangible asset,' 9 it is unclear
whether any of the value attributable to the trademark can be included in the
valuation of a tangible asset. Upon this question the case seems to be one of first
impression.
The government argued that the value of the name had not yet attached to
the unbottled whiskey because it was still work in process. The taxpayer claimed
that the whiskey was unlike normal work in process in that with or without the
Jack Daniel name, the whiskey had substantial value because of its inherent unique-
ness. It was the distillation and leeching processes rather than the aging and bottling
that gave the whiskey its distinctive flavor.20 The court concluded that the whiskey
had reached a stage where its unique and distinctive qualities had given its name
a value inseparable from the item itself.
The best possible interpretation of the court's decision here is that there are
two valuable incidents of ownership which correspond with the two functions of a
trademark or trade name.21 The first of these incidents emerges from that function
of a trademark that protects the goodwill of a trade or business. 22 Its value is an
intangible one, involving the protection or insurance of future profits. The other
incident of value comes from the right to control the use of the trademark in con-
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c) (4) (viii) (1955) provides in part that ". . . the
adjusted basis of the stock . ..shall be allocated as basis amone the various
assets received. . . .Ordinarily, such allocation shall be made in proportion to
the net fair market values of such assets on the date received ... "
19. P. GITLIN AND W. WOODWARD, TAX ASPECTS OF PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND
TRADEMARKS (1960), Kragen and Pearce, Tax Problems in the Trademark and
Trade Name Field, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 511 (1956), Meyer and Creed, Trademarks
and Taxes, 8 IDEA 377 (1964); Scharf, Trademark Problems in Acquzisitions and
Mergers: Tax Aspects, 57 T.M.R. 755, 755 (1967), where it was said: "For income
tax purposes, a trademark is an intangible asset which has a useful life of indefinite
duration."
20. The court used Cadillac automobiles for an example in contrast. The
inherent uniqueness attaches to a Cadillac not when all the parts are ready for
assembly; rather, the distinctive qualities begin to adhere to the car during assem-
bly so that the value of the name "Cadillac" becomes inseparable from the car
itself. Jack Daniel Distillery v. United States, 379 F.2d 569, 575 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
21. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
22. In United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918),
Mr. Justice Pitney said:
The law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair
competition; the right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its
mere adoption; its function is simply to designate the goods as the prod-
uct of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of
another's product as his; and it is not the subject of property except in
connection with an existing business.
[Vol. 34
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nection with a manufactured article.23 This element looks to the present and
actually enhances the value of the manufactured item by reducing its vulnerability
to competition. It is this latter value that attaches to the tangible asset and becomes
a part of its fair market value. Thus, the value attributable to the use of the
Jack Daniel trade name and label was included in the fair market valuation of
the unbottled inventory.24 Since the parties made an arms-length allocation 25 of
$2.5 million to goodwill the court must have reasoned that the intangible value of
the trade name and labels, which is the value derived from protection of future
profits, was included in this allocation to goodwill. 26 Moreover, it is an accepted ac-
counting principle that in an acquisition of a business, the excess cost of assets
23. In Seattle Brewing and Malting Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 856, 868
(1946), aff'd 165 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1948), it was stated:
The right to use a trade name is a monopoly as is a copyright or a
patent. It carries with it the right to control its use in connection with
a manufactured article and to prevent any competition that might destroy
its value. It is a property right and the trade name is property, no less
so because it is intangible.
24. The court stated that in terms of commercial reality, no businessman
would have sold the unbottled whiskey unbranded on the bulk market because this
would not have brought the best possible price. Jack Daniel Distillery v. United
States, 379 F.2d 569, 576 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
25. The court placed great emphasis on the good faith nature of the transaction
carried on between the buyer and seller. Defendant had attacked the negotiations
as a sham for tax purposes. But the trial commissioner concluded that the parties
to the sale acted in good faith when they agreed on the insurance value as the
fair market value of the whiskey. In Philadelphia Steel and Iron Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 558, 566 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d
964 (3rd Cir. 1965) the court stated:
Ordinarily, if the court, on the basis of its consideration of all the facts
in a particular case concludes that the vendor and vendee. by their agree-
ment in an arm's-length transaction, have made a fair allocation of de-
preciable and nondepreciable assets, including good will, their agreement
will not be disturbed.
However, where the valuations in the agreement are not in accord with
reality, the courts are not bound by the allocation. See Copperhead Coal Co.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1959). In Seaton Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 303 (1954), the conflict was over valuation
of depreciable assets. The court upheld the agreement of the parties even though
no value was allocated to goodwill when it was obviously present See the Motel
Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. 825 (1963), aff'd, 340 F.2d 445 (1965).
26. In Grace Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170, 176 (9th Cir. 1949),
it was stated that:
... good will may attach to (1) the business as an entity, (2) the physical
plant in which it is conducted, (3) the trade-name under which it is car-
ried on and the right to conduct it at the particular place or within a
particular area, under a trade-name or trademark; (4) the special knowl-
edge or the 'know-how' of its staff; (5) the number and quality of its
customers.
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acquired over the book values they carry may be allocated to the tangible asset that
created the value itself rather than goodwill 27
The decision in Jack Daniel accepts the concept of net realizable value as a
measure of fair market value of unique inventory. Thus, the principle will be
applicable to lump sum purchases of businesses in which the purchase price is
allocated to unique inventories in proportion to their fair market values.28 In this
respect the decision adds to previous decisions.29 The decision also recognizes that
in allocating a value to an asset, there may be incidents of ownership which are
intangible in nature, but which are so closely linked to a tangible asset that their
value can be considered as part of the value of the tangible assets. While this aspect
of the Jack Daniel case seems to be one of first impression, it is in harmony with
commercial reality and should be followed in situations involving valuation of
unique inventories.
THOMAS JEAN O'NEIL
27. A. WYATT, A CRITICAL STUDY OF ACCOUNING FOR BUSINESS COMBINA-
TIONS, AN AccourNTNG RESEARCH STUDY OF THE AICPA, 63 (1963), where it stated:
The generally accepted accounting practice of accounting for assets
at cost involves the use of fair market value of that which is eiven in
exchange for the fair market value of that which is acquired, whichever
is more readily determinable, as the appropriate measure of cost. Nothing
in this concept requires that the excess of cost (as so measured) of prop-
erties acquired over the book value thereof be labeled or described as
goodwill. In all cases, this excess should be allocated according to the fac-
tor or factors which created it. Accordingly, the excess may be allocated
among a variety of accounts, e.g., inventories, fixed properties, intangibles
other than goodwill, and goodwill (in the pure sense).
This statement was based on a survey of purchase combinations during the 1958-60
period. The study found that the excess of cost over book value of assets required
was allocated to tangible assets as frequently as it was allocated to goodwill.
See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 237 and Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 CUM.
BULL. 370. See note 10 supra,
28. See note 4 supra.
29. Space Controls, Inc. v. Comm'r, 332 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1965); E. W.
Bliss Co. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 374 (N.D. Ohio 1963); Berg v.
Comm'r, 167 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Wisc. 1958); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.471-4(b),
1.471-6, 1.471-8 (1958); R. Hoffman, Inventories, 48 MAR9. L. REV. 191, 193-195(1964) (net realizable value discussed); Comment, Inventory Problems Under the
Federal Income Tax, 44 MARg. L. REv. 335, 369-373 (1960) (farm-price method
and retail method discussed). But see Loveman & Son Exports Corp. v. Comm'r, 34
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CREDITOR RIGHTS-GARNISHMENT OF A JOINT AND SURVIVORSHIP
BANK ACCOUNT FOR INDIVIDUAL DEBT OF ONE DEPOSITOR
Nieman v. First National Bank of Joplin1
A and B maintained a joint and survivorship bank account. The deposit
agreement provided rights of survivorship and that either A or B could withdraw
any or all the funds from the account. C, the former wife of B, secured a judgment
against B for alimony and child support.. C summoned First National Bank of
Joplin as garnishee in order to collect the judgment from the joint bank account.
A intervened, and moved that the garnishment be dissolved. In support of this
motion, A presented evidence that the entire fund in the account represented her
own personal savings and deposits. C argued that the introduction of this evi-
dence varied the terms of the deposit agreement and thus violated the parol
evidence rule. The trial court rejected the argument of C, and released the First
National Bank from the garnishment. The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that where the debtor depositor has no actual financial investment in the
account, the creditor may not invade the account to collect the judgment.2
The joint and survivorship bank account has become a popular arrangement
by which the depositor can retain the use of the account fund during his lifetime
and, at his death, pass the money to the survivor without complying with the
formal requirements of a will. 3 Joint bank accounts are also used often to achieve
the convenience of use and access by all the parties to the account. The courts,
noting the combination of joint ownership and rights of survivorship, have tended
to label this banking relationship as a joint tenancy.5 However, this classification
is not technically correct because of the right of either depositor, against the bank,
to withdraw all of the money.6 Thus, it is understandable that the courts have
1. 420 S.W.2d 20 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
2. Nieman v. First National Bank of Joplin, 420 S.W.2d 20 (K.C. Mo. App.
1967).
3. See generally Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A Con-
cept Withut a Name, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 596 (1953); Kepner, Five More Years
of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. CnI. L. REv. 376 (1959); Schrader,
Bank Deposits as Will Substitutes in Missouri, 28 Mo. L. REv. 482 (1963).
4. The right of a creditor to garnish this type of joint account for the
individual debt of one depositor is not considered in this note. Since the bank may
provide the same form for both a survivorship and "convenience" account, there
may be an evidentiary problem in distinguishing between the accounts. See text
supported by notes 34-38, infra.
5. Statutes in numerous states refer to the parties to the account as joint
tenants, e.g., § 362.470, RSMo 1959, as amended 1967.
6. Note, 71 HA.v. L. REv. 557 (1958); Park Enterprises v. Trach, 233 Minn.
467, 47 N.W.2d 194 (1951). In Ambruster v. Ambruster, 326 Mo. 51, 72, 31
S.W.2d 28, 37 (1930), the court stated that it is an economic fact that the typical
depositor withdraws without giving a thought to the possibility that he has the
right to withdraw only one-half of the fund. The author of Comment, Survivorship
in Joint Bank Accounts, 16 WAsH. L. Rnv. 105, 109 (1941), points out that there
seem to be two meanings of joint tenancy, one a common law estate, the other
an interest and right of survivorship in a joint bank account.
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not reached uniform determinations of the per cent of the joint account fund that
may be garnished when the debtor depositor has made no actual contribution to
the joint bank account
The Kansas City Court of Appeals, as a result of the decision in Nieman v.
First National Bank of Joplin,8 has adopted the majority view9 that the garnish-
ment of a joint bank account can reach only that proportion of the joint fund
owned by the debtor; and evidence is admissible to show the actual contribution
of each depositor. Courts recognize that the agreement between the joint de-
positors as to their banking relationship may not be reflected in the appearance
of joint ownership manifested by the joint bank account.' 0 Thus, the courts can
distinguish situations in which the depositor intended to make a gift of a present
interest in the account from those situations where the joint bank account was only
utilized to make a testamentary gift."1 In either situation, each depositor has
right of withdrawal against the bank. But, in those cases where only a testamentary
gift was intended, there often exists a private understanding between the parties
to the account that the co-depositor's right of withdrawal will not be exercised until
the death of the depositor.' 2 By permitting evidence of actual ownership in a gar-
nishment case, the courts avoid transforming what was understood by the depositors
as a testamentary transaction into an inter vivos gift13
7. Hayden v. Gardner, 238 Ark. 351, 381 S.W.2d 752 (1964): Park Enter-
prises v. Trach, supra note 6; Dover Trust Co. v. Brooks, 111 N.J. Eq. 40, 160 A.
890 (1932). A few cases hold that a joint bank account is not subject to garnish-
ment by the creditor of one of the depositors. For example, in jurisdictions that
recognize tenancies by the entirety in personal property, the creditor of one spouse
could not invade an account held by entirety. See, e.g., Cullum v. Rice, 236 Mo.
App. 1113, 162 S.W.2d 342 (K.C. Ct. App. 1942).
8. 420 S.W.2d (K.C. Mo. App. 1967). An earlier case, Schnellmann v. South-
ern Commercial and Savings Bank, 123 Mo. App. 188, 100 S.W. 575 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1907), seemingly approved the admission of evidence to show respective
ownership of the depositors in a joint bank account. However, the holding may
have been influenced by the fact that the joint account stood in the name of hus-
band and wife. See text at note 7 supra.
9. Hayden v. Gardner, 238 Ark. 351, 381 S.W.2d 752 (1964); Tinsley v.
Bauer, 125 Cal. App.2d 724, 271 P.2d 116 (1954); Leaf v. McCowan, 13 Ill. App.2d
58, 141 N.E.2d 67 (1957); Union Properties v. Cleveland Trust Co., 152 Ohio St
430, 89 N.E.2d 638 (1949); Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1465 (1967).
10. See Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts: The Poor Man's Will, 53 COLUM.
L. Rrv. 103 (1953), where the author concludes that the same joint bank account
form can be used to allow an agent to transact business, to facilitate the handling
of family income, to evade bank regulation, to make an inter vivos gift, and to
effectuate a testamentary disposition.
11. Intervenor testified: "I put the children's name on the account so if any-
thing happened to me, in case of death, it could be their money and they wouldn't
have to go through court." Nieman v. First National Bank of Joplin, 420 S.W.2d
20, 21 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
12. The account in the Nieman case bore the names of a mother and her
three children. Since many joint bank accounts are between family members, such
an agreement is understandable; Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account
-A Concept Without a Name, 41 CALiF. L. REv. 596 (1953).
13. Nieman v. First National Bank of Joplin, 420 S.W.2d 20 (K.C. Mo. App.
1967). See Note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 557 (1958).
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Two other positions, neither of which is concerned with the actual ownership
of the depositors in the joint bank account, have been taken by the courts. One
view is that the joint bank account is a strict joint tenancy.14 The effect of the
garnishment is to sever the joint tenant relationship thus making the parties to
the account tenants in common. The creditor, consequently, can garnish the share
of his debtor.15 The second position, on the other hand, is the Minnesota rule
which subjects the entire joint account to garnishment.16 The Minnesota Supreme
Court reasoned that since the debtor co-depositor had a right to withdraw all the
money in the account, the creditor, subrogated to this right, should have no less.17
The reasoning of Park Enterprises v. Track'8 seems persuasive,19 but the focus
upon the right of withdrawal is inconsistent with the two prior views, and no other
American jurisdiction has adopted this result.20
The creditor in Nieman relied upon the rule of Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts2 '
to avoid the proposition that the joint bank account form did not control in a
suit by an individual creditor. Watts involved a claim by the executor of a de-
positor's estate that the ownership of the funds in a joint account did not pass
to the survivor. Because the form of the joint bank account does not reveal the
reason for creating the account, 22 the courts have used a variety of theories23 to
14. Dover Trust Co. v. Brooks, 111 N.J. Eq. 40, 160 A. 890 (1932); American
Oil Co. v. Falconer, 136 Pa. Super. 598, 8A.2d 418 (1939).
15. Dover Trust Co. v. Brooks, supra note 14; American Oil Co. v. Falconer,
supra note 14; Note, The Right of The Individual Creditor Against The Joint and
Survivorship Bank Account, 42 IowA L. REv. 551 (1957).
16. Park Enterprises v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W.2d 194 (1951), 36
MINN. L. REV. 93.
17. Ibid.
18. 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W.2d 194 (1951).
19. The author of Note, 36 MINN. L. REv. 93 (1951), concludes that tje
Park case, supra note 18, recognized that a depositor really has no property in-
terest in the joint bank account but only a chose in action against the bank for
the money owed to him. It is certainly true that a bank account embodies a
creditor-debtor relationship; e.g., Aetna National Bank v. Fourth National Bank,
46 N.Y. 82 (1871). Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1465, 1468 (1967), explains that charac-
terization of the joint bank account under property concepts "[Hlas furnished
a convenient vehicle for the application of equitable principles apparently neces-
sary where a creditor seeks to garnish a chose in action in which someone other
than the debtor has an interest."
20. For a Canadian case in accord, see Empire Fertilizer v. Cioci, 4 D.L.R. 804
(Ont. App. 1934); See also Walt, Creditor Action In Reaching The Multiple
Owner Account, 21 Bus. LAW. 225 (1965), advocates the approach of Park Enter-
prises v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W.2d 194 (1951). However, in Leaf v. Mc-
Gowan, 13 II. App.2d 58, 141 N.E.2d 67 (1957), the court expressly rejected the
reasoning in the Park case supra.
21. 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W.2d 817 (1950); accord, Connor v. Temm, 270
S.W.2d 541 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954).
22. See note 10 supra.
23. See, e.g., In re Geel's Estate, 143 S.W.2d 327 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940),
trust; Ball v. Mercantile Trust Co., 220 Mo. App. 1165, 297 S.W. 415 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1927), joint tenancy; Commonwealth Trust Co. v. DuMontimer, 193 Mo.
App. 290, 183 S.W. 1137 (St. L. App. 1916), gift; Schrader, Bank Deposits as Will
Substitutes in Missouri, 28 Mo. L. REv. 482 (1963).
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determine if the survivor has the right to the money deposited by the decedent.
In Watts, the court upheld the right of survivorship by regarding the deposit
agreement as a contract. Thus, the parol evidence rule barred evidence of the
intent of the deceased depositor; this made an inquiry into the actual contribu-
tion of the depositors immaterial since all of the money in the account passed
under the right of survivorship. 24 In Nieman, the creditor argued that it should
follow logically from Watts that parol evidence to show ownership of the money
in the joint bank account would be inadmissible in a garnishment suit by an
individual creditor.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals stated that the parol evidence rule did
not apply because the creditor was a stranger to the deposit contract.2 5 Moreover,
the court suggested that, since the depositors were living, it was more equitable
to admit evidence of actual ownership.2 6 The Ohio Supreme Court in a case similar
to Nieman explained:
Here, we are concerned wholly with a subsisting deposit intact and the
rights, intention and attitude of the depositors with respect thereto during
their joint lives . . . the 'realities of ownership' may be shown.27
Furthermore, the court may have been reluctant to make the deposit contract
conclusive because its terms are ambiguous in respect to the inter vivos rights
of the parties to the account,28 even though explicit as to the right of survivorship.
Courts give effect to the survivorship feature of the joint bank account on
the theory that the depositors had joint interests in the account during their
lives.2 0 It would seem that, since there must be a present interest in the joint
account in order to validate the right of survivorship, the creditor of the debtor
24. Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W. 817 (1950). For
cases from other jurisdictions, see: In re Gaines' Estate, 15 Cal.2d 255, 100 P.2d
1055 (1940); Hill v. Havens, 48 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1951); Chippendale v. North
Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N.E. 371 (1916).
25. Nieman v. First National Bank of Joplin, 420 S.W.2d 20 (K.C. Mo. App.
1967).
26. The creditor had "... no equitable interest in the fund . . .". Nieman v.
First National Bank of Joplin, supra note 25 at 23. In Leaf v. McGowan, 13 Ill.
App.2d 58, 141 N.E.2d 67 (1957), the court said it would be "unduly harsh" to
bar evidence of actual ownership.
27. Union Properties v. Cleveland Trust Co., 152 Ohio St. 430, 434-35, 89
N.E.2d 638, 640-41 (1949).
28. See note 6 supra. But in some jurisdictions, the power to withdraw is one
thing, the right to appropriate the withdrawn funds to the exclusive use of one
party to the account may be another. See: Campagna v. Campagna, 337 Mass.
599, 150 N.E.2d 699 (1958); Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 115 A.2d 197 (1955).
29. Because of the formal requirements on testamentary instruments, the
courts have held that an account in the form "A, payable at death to B" does not
pass the fund under the right of survivorship. Thus, in order to sustain the sur-
vivorship feature of the account, a court must find that B had some interest in
the account during the lifetime of A, so that the fund did not pass simply because
of the death of A. For a more detailed discussion, see Kepner. Five More Years of
The Joint Bank Accound Muddle, 26 U. Cm. L. Rav. 376, 376-77 (1959).
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depositor should be able to garnish the account to the extent of this present in-
terest. The court, in Niemn, did not consider the rationale of the survivorship
cases in the context of a garnishment action by the individual creditor of one
party to the joint bank account. Nevertheless, to deny that the debtor depositor
had a present interest in the account is simply to deny the reasoning by which
the survivorship feature is given effect.30 The justification is that this present
interest is merely a guise by which courts assure the survivorship feature of the
joint bank account. 31 However, it is certainly not desirable to have such an incon-
sistency of concepts between survivorship and creditor cases. The suggestion, often
reiterated,3 2 that the joint account be recognized as a specialized technique to
hold and pass property, has lost none of its merit.83
As a final point it should be noted that in Nieman the court did not indicate
whether ownership depended solely upon the source of the money, or whether
ownership meant the respective interest of each 'depositor at the time of the
garnishment 3 4 It is submitted that ownership should be broad enough to encom-
pass a gift of all or part of the money in the account.3 5 Since the depositors dearly
have greater access to information concerning their respective interest in the
account, the burden of showing that the debtor depositor did not have a financial
investment in the joint account should be placed upon the depositors36 Many
30. For a full discussion see Comment, Property-joint Bank Accounts-The
Donees Inter Vivos Interest, 60 MIcE. L. REv. 972 (1962).
31. "In practice, the depositor of the funds credited to the joint account does
not surrender control during his lifetime. The gift is as conditional as a will and
is, in fact, perfected only by the death of the donor. The inter vivos disputes
clearly established that the transaction is gratuitous, that it is inchoate until the
death of the doner. . . ." Kepner, Five More Years of The Joint Bank Account
Muddle, 26 U. CmI. L. REv. 376, 396 (1959).
32. For a model statute, see Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account
-A Concept Without a Name, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 596 (1953). See also Schrader,
Bank Deposits as Will Substitutes in Missouri, 28 Mo. L. REv. 482 (1963); Note,
53 COLTrM. L. Rnv. 103 (1953).
33. Cf. In re Michael's Estate, 26 Wis.2d 382, 398, 132 N.W.2d 557, 565
(1965) the court said:
The joint bank account is a comparatively new device in the long de-
velopment of the law. .. . Such an account provides a useful technique
for transferring property, and need not fit any of the historical and tra-
ditional property concepts associated with the law of inter vivos gifts
and joint tenancy.
34. The court suggested that ownership was based upon the monetary con-
tribution of, each party to the joint account. However, the court did not have to
define ownership because the creditor relied solely upon the form of the joint bank
account as the basis of his claim. The form of the account does not control in a
suit by an individual creditor; Union Properties v. Cleveland Trust Co., 152 Ohio
St. 430, 89 N.E.2d 638 (1949). But this does not foreclose a contention by an
individual creditor that the actual contributor intended a aift of part or all of the
account to the debtor depositor; Leaf v. McGowan, 13 Ill. App. 58, 141 N.E.2d 67
(1957).
35. Hayden v. Gardner, 238 Ark. 351, 381 S.W.2d 752 (1964); Leaf v. Mc-
Gowan, supra note 34.
36. See, e.g., Nieman v. First National Bank of Toplin, 420 S.W.2d 20 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1967); Tinsley v. Bauer, 125 Cal. App.2d 724, 271 P.2d 116 (1954);
Contra, Esposito v. Palovick, 29 N.J. Super. 3, 101 A.2d 568 (1953).
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courts state that the appearance of joint ownership in a joint bank account gives
rise to a rebuttable presumption that all of the money in the account belongs to
the debtor depositor.37 In Nieman, the court did not discuss the matter of pre-
sumptions. However, in future cases, it would seem equitable to regard a showing
that the debtor was a party to a joint bank account as prima facie proof of owner-
ship of the entire account 38
In summary, the rule adopted in Nieman that the garnishment of a joint
bank account can reach only that portion owned by the debtor is sound. Since
the form of the joint bank account does not always mirror the actual banking
relationship of the depositors, evidence of actual ownership should be admissible
in order to avoid irreparable harm to the interest of the non-debtor depositor.
Because of the ability of the depositors to obscure the nature of their relationship,
it seems justifiable to presume, prima fade, that the debtor owns all of the money
in the joint bank account, and to place the burden upon the depositors to rebut
this presumption.
EDwARD H. SHEPPARD
SUBCHAPTER S-NET OPERATING LOSS CARRYBACK
Richard L. Plowden'
Taxpayers Plowden and Roberts formed a corporation in 1953 under the laws
of South Carolina. Each contributed initial capital of $1,000 and received in
return fifty per cent of the stock issued by the corporation. On January 1, 1962,
the corporation elected to be taxed as a small business corporation under the
provisions of subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code of 19542
For the taxable year 1962, the corporation reported taxable income of
$30,887.32, of which $30,852.64 was undistributed. For the following year, 1963,
the corporation reported a net operating loss of $109,229.80. In their individual
returns for 1963 taxpayers each claimed one-half of the corporation's net operating
loss for that year; with these deductions included, Plowden reported a net operat-
ing loss of $36,909.21 and Roberts reported a net operating loss of $34,078.71 for
1963. Thereafter each taxpayer filed a timely application requesting the carryback
of his 1963 net operating loss to the taxable years 1960, 1961 and 1962.3 The dis-
trict director approved the applications and made appropriate refunds for those
37. Hayden v. Gardner, 238 Ark. 351, 381 S.W.2d 752 (1964); Leaf v. Mc-
Gowan, 13 111. App.2d 58, 141 N.E.2d 67 (1957).
38. Hayden v. Gardner, supra note 37; Leaf v. McGowan, su-Pra note 37.
1. 48 T.C. No. 64 (1967). This case is now on appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
2. INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371-77.
3. A net operating loss for any taxable year ending after December 31, 1957
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years. The Commissioner subsequently asserted deficiencies against taxpayers for,
those years, limiting each taxpayers' pro rata share of the corporation's 1963 net
operating loss as follows:
Plowden Roberts
Loss claimed per return $54,614.90 $54,614.90
Original cost of stock $1,000.00 $1,000.00
1962 undistributed taxable income 15,426.32 15,426.32
Corporate indebtedness to
shareholders 5,000.00
Total loss allowed 16,426.32 21,426.32
Loss disallowed $38,188.58 $33,188.58
Each taxpayer had income from other sources which exceeded his allowable
share of the corporation's net operating loss. Because of this, the Commissioner
determined that neither taxpayer had sustained a net operating loss for the year
1963 and therefore no operating loss carrybacks were available as deductions for
the years 1960-1962.
Section 1374(c) (2) of the 1954 Code limits a shareholder's portion of the net
operating loss of an electing small business corporation for any taxable year to an
amount not to exceed the sum of the adjusted basis of his stock in the corpora-
tion plus the adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the corporation to the share-
holder. Taxpayers contended respondent should not have used the general basis
provisions of the Code4 in computing the adjusted basis of their stock for pur-
poses of applying section 1374(c) (2). They argued that the term "adjusted basig"
has a unique meaning when applied to subchapter S stock, and pointed out that
the subchapter S provisions do not define adjusted basis. The court summarily
dismissed this contention by reference to Byrne v. Commirssoner,5 where taxpayer
argued unsuccessfully that the adjusted basis of his subchapter S stock shoulid
be its fair market value at the time the corporation elected to be taxed under
subchapter S, rather than the taxpayer's cost.6
Taxpayers' principal contention was that the limitation contained in section
1374(c) (2) applies only in determining the amount of the deduction to which the
shareholder is entitled for the year in which the corporation sustained the loss;
it does not preclude the use of the balance of the corporation's net operating loss
as a carryback to shareholders' prior taxable years. Taxpayers argued that if the
corporation were the taxpaying entity it would be able to take full advantage of
the carryback privilege and that they should have the same latitude the corpo-
ration would have if there were no subchapter S election. The court's answer to
this argument was based on the definition of net operating loss, which, subject
to certain modifications, is "the excess of the deductions allowed by this chapter
4. The Commissioner determined the basis of petitioners stock by applying
§ 1012'and § 1016, Imr. REv. CODE of 1954.
5. 361 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1966).
6. Id. at 941-42.
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over the gross income."7 The court interpreted section 1374(c) (2) as limiting the
allowable deduction to a shareholder for an S corporations net operating loss. The
court said that taxpayers argument would be more properly addressed to Congress.
Subchapter S, consisting of sections 1371 through 1377 of the Internal Revenue
Code, was enacted as part of the Technical Amendments Acts of 1958, and permits
certain domestic corporations to be taxed in several ways similar to a partnership.
Its purpose was "to allow businesses to select their form of organization without
the necessity of taking into account major differences in tax consequences." 9
One of the similarities between the taxation of subchapter S corporations and
the taxation of partnerships under subchapter K is that net operating losses are
passed through the business entity and are deductible by the stockholders or
partners as individuals.10 A partner's distributive share of the partnership loss
is limited to the adjusted basis of his interest in the partnership at the end of the
partnership year in which the loss occurred. This provision is analogous to section
1374(c) (2) of subchapter S, and is designed to limit the net operating loss de-
duction to situations where the taxpayer has suffered a true economic loss. How-
ever, the law establishes a suspense account for any net operating loss in excess of
the partner's basis, and the partner is allowed a deduction at the end of any
succeeding partnership year in which his adjusted basis increases sufficiently to
absorb the unused loss. This gives the partner a perpetual right to carry forward
the partnership's net operating loss.
In general, the basis of a partner's interest in the partnership includes his
capital contribution to the partnership, increased by his distributive share of part-
nership earnings, and decreased by his withdrawals. 11 An increase in partnership
liabilities is considered a contribution to the partnership and an addition to basis- 2
Conversely, a decrease in partnership liabilities is considered a withdrawal and a
reduction of basis.13 The ability to manipulate the basis of his interest in the
partnership by additional capital contributions 14 or by varying the amount of
partnership liabilities, coupled with the perpetual carry forward privilege give
the partner great flexibility in timing his net operating loss deduction. For exam-
ple, if a partner does not wish to take his full share of the partnership loss in
the current year, partnership debts may be decreased to limit the amount of
allowable loss in the current year and then increased in a subsequent year when
the deduction would be more advantageous.
7. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 172(c).
8. The Technical Amendments Act of 1958 § 64, INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
H 1371-77.
9. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1958).
10. INT. REv. CODE of 1954 §§ 702, 704.
11. INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, §§ '705, 722.
12. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 752.
13. Ibid.
14. There may be an implied condition that the capital contribution have a
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By comparison, the subchapter S stockholder has less flexibility- in timing
his net operating loss deduction, and to the extent it exceeds his basis he may
forfeit the deduction.15 The stockholder can -avoid forfeiture by increasing his
basis, prior to the close of the taxable year in which the loss occurred, to an
amount equal to his portion of the net operating loss. However, the means by
which the stockholder can adjust his basis possess inherent dangers which militate
against their use.
The stockholder may increase his basis by contributing additional equity.
captal or making a loan to the corporation.16 Stockholder loans create problems
under subchapter S because they may be classified as a second class of stock and
thus result in a forfeiture of the corporation's status as a small business corpo-
ration.17 The other alternative is for the shareholder to contribute additional equity
capital, but the disadvantage in this method is that the stockholder may not be
able to withdraw the money at a later date without adverse tax consequences.18
The decision in Richard L. Plowden is significant in that it illustrates a flaw
in the implementation of, the subchapter S philosophy. If the purpose of sub-
chapter S is to allow a small business to select its form of organization free from
any major tax consideration,' 9 then this purpose has been thwarted by section
1374(c) (2). The very restrictive provision governing net operating loss deductions
for subchapter S shareholders could discourage a newly formed business from
electing subchapter S. In view of this, section 1374(c) (2) should be amended to
provide for the preservation of that portion of the net operating loss which exceeds
the stockholder's basis. This excess loss would then be available to the stockholder
in subsequent years when additional capital contributions or corporate earnings
increase his basis sufficiently to absorb the loss.
JAMES D. VESELICH
15. INT. Rnv. CoDe of 1954, § 1374(c) (2).
16. Ibid.
17. One of the requirements with which a subchapter S corporation must
comply in order to qualify for its special tax status is that the corporation must
have only one class of stock. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954. § 1371(a). This is a con-
tinuing requirement, and a loan agreement between a shareholder and the corpo-
ration could create a disqualifying second class of stock. Catalina Homes, Inc., 23
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 (1964); Henderson v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 782
(M.D. Ala. 1965); W. C. Gamman, 46 T.C. 1 (1966).
18. To the extent a small business corporation has accumulated earnings
which exceed previously taxed income, any withdrawal by a shareholder will be
treated as a dividend distribution. Thus, the shareholder would have to withdraw
all the earnings of the corporation in the taxable year. and be taxed on them,
before his withdrawals would be treated as a reduction of canital.
19. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1958).
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